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Abstract
The welfare gains of economic growth hinge on the ability of households to insure
consumption against the risks associated with growth. We exploit a novel and unique op-
portunity to study this question using China, an economy that has witnessed enormous and
sustained growth and for which we build a long panel of household-level consumption and
income. We find that consumption insurance deteriorates along the growth process with a
transmission of permanent income shocks to consumption that triples from 1989 to 2009.
The loss of consumption insurance has implications for the welfare assessment of economic
growth across time and across space.
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1 Introduction
Countries that take off from poverty and begin to rapidly raise their standards of living are
potentially subject to increasing income risks—i.e., unanticipated changes in income. This relation
can arise from the new sets of projects and opportunities generating growth (Greenwood and
Jovanovic, 1990; Greenwood et al., 2010; Cole et al., 2016).1 In this context, the ultimate
purpose of growth, welfare improvement, hinges not only on growth per se but also on the ability
of households to insure their consumption against the increasing risks associated with growth.
We investigate this question by measuring the transmission of income inequality to consumption
inequality for a country over a period of fast economic transformation: China from 1989 to 2009.
During those twenty years, China has raised the income per capita by a factor of 6, i.e., at 7.5
times the speed of the first industrial revolution.2 To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
study that empirically explores the joint dynamics between consumption insurance and economic
growth. To do so, we recover unique panel data on household-level consumption and income for
a developing country that has successfully undergone sustained growth over a long span of years,
i.e., an ideal scenario to study the relationship between growth, risk and insurance.
The phenomenal growth of China has spurred much academic research (Zhu, 2012; Storeslet-
ten and Zilibotti, 2014; Yao, 2014). However, it is hard to imagine that all households enjoy
the same consumption path—then welfare—along the growth process. In particular, if household
income risk increases with growth, the evolution of the ability to insure consumption against these
risks is crucial to determine ex-ante households’ welfare. This raises the following questions. First,
how much does household income risk change during the economic growth? Second, how much
does the ability to hedge against these risks change along this growth process? Further, in the
context of China, with a system of public transfers that is based on the area of residency, how
much do income risks and consumption insurance differ between rural and urban areas? These
are the questions that we quantitatively answer here.
Our main finding is that economic growth is associated with more income risk and a loss of
consumption insurance. We obtain these results in several steps. First, to be able to quantify
income risks and insurance, one requires a panel of household consumption and income, a data
requirement that is demanding even for the U.S. (Heathcote et al., 2010a; Carroll et al., 2014). In
1A positive relationship between income risk and growth can arise from the choice of risky projects that are
more likely to yield higher income growth (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990). Alternatively, it is the presence
of risky income that accelerate the accumulation of capital for precautionary reasons, which in turn leads to
higher income levels (Krusell and Smith, 1998). Interestingly, the sign of the relationship between growth and risk
might depend on the stage of economic development. Indeed, in an influential paper, Ramey and Ramey (1995)
document a negative relationship between growth and volatility using a set of relatively rich OECD countries.
2It took the U.K. from 1820 to 1970 to raise the income by that factor (Bolt and van Zanden, 2013).
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the case of China, the data limitations are also important (Ligon, 2007). Our first contribution is
the construction of a panel of household consumption and income in rural and urban China from
1989 to 2009. We build these measures from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS),
a publicly available data source widely used for nutritional and medical research on China.3 The
same data set has recently been used to study the effect of the housing reform—that privatized
the housing market in China—on housing prices (Wang, 2011). We use a novel approach to
construct food consumption from the Nutrition Survey, a core component of the CHNS that
meticulously records the daily diet of all members in a household. Together with the local food
price data from the Community Survey of the CHNS, we construct the value of diet, i.e., food
consumption, for each household. We use the spatial deflator supplied by the CHNS that takes
into account the important differences in price levels across rural and urban areas in different
provinces. Compared with the official inflation numbers, the deflator we use implies slightly
lower inflation from 1989 to 1997 and higher inflation from 1997 to 2009, a feature that is
consistent with the evidence in Nakamura et al. (2016). With food consumption, the major
component of nondurable consumption, and other pieces of nondurable consumption, services
and semi-durables in hand, we consistently capture about 60-70% of a typical rural household’s
consumption basket and 50-60% of a typical urban household’s consumption basket. There are
two important advantages from using a consumption measure largely based on food. First, it
helps reduce potential measurement errors, a point that has been made to argue for the study of
consumption insurance solely based on food (Attanasio et al., 2014). Second, it sets our results
on the loss in insurance as a lower bound of such losses given that food consumption inequality
tends to be lower than nonfood consumption inequality (Aguiar and Hurst, 2014). In terms of
income, we use raw data from each household member to construct a measure of household
income, consistent and harmonized across waves. Importantly, we separately recover the full set
of public and private transfers received by all household members.
Second, the large set of potential insurance mechanisms that households can use in practice
suggests that there might be not one but a combination of such mechanisms at work in order to
explain the entire amount of risk sharing observed in an economy. Therefore, we opt to follow the
premise in Deaton (1997) that calls for an assessment of the overall amount of risk sharing without
specifying particular mechanisms (i.e., endowments, technologies or market arrangements). In
this direction, we apply the proposed method in Blundell et al. (2008) to directly quantify how
much of the permanent and transitory shocks pass onto consumption.4 Since we are interested in
3The CHNS is an on-going project between the Carolina Population Center at the University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill and the National Institute of Nutrition and Food Safety at the Chinese Center for Disease Control
and Prevention. We discuss CHNS in great detail in section 3.
4An alternative approach for studying risk sharing is to ascribe consumption behavior to a specific mechanism
that structurally predicts distinct consumption responses to changes in income (Heathcote et al., 2009).
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the relationship of risk and insurance to growth, we allow both the income risk, i.e. the variance
of the residual (or within-group) income inequality, and the consumption insurance parameters,
i.e. the pass-through coefficients, to change over time.
We find that income risk has significantly increased with growth in rural and urban China
from 1989 to 2009, and has remained the major component behind income inequality throughout
the entire sample period. Our decomposition of income risks between permanent and transitory
components reveals that a large part of the increase in residual inequality is driven by the per-
manent component, which is harder to insure and hence more costly in terms of welfare. At the
same time that income risk rises with growth, we find that the ability to insure consumption has
substantially deteriorated with growth. Precisely, while 12% of permanent shocks are passed to
consumption in the 1990s in rural areas, close to 30% of permanent shocks are transmitted to
consumption in the 2000s. The transmission coefficient for the urban sample increases from 8%
to 22%. That is, the transmission of permanent income shocks to consumption has increased by a
factor of almost 3 in the last decade, a significant worsening in the ability to insure consumption.
The growth-insurance trade-off also holds across space between communities with high income
growth versus communities with low income growth. High-growth communities experience both
more risks and a larger deterioration in the ability to insure consumption over time.5 In terms
of the transmission of transitory shocks to consumption, rural households show a high degree of
consumption insurance over the entire sample period, a result consistent with the findings in the
rural settings of poor countries (Townsend, 1994; Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2016). In contrast,
urban households face a deterioration of consumption insurance against transitory shocks along
the growth process, which is almost entirely mitigated by public transfers.
In an economy with high and increasing savings rates, it is natural to ask whether savings
help fend off increasing permanent income risks. We provide evidence that the two predominant
life-cycle savings in China in the form of investments in children and housing wealth—which
represent three fourths of the total household wealth—are associated with reductions in the
ability to insure. Investments in children are associated with an insurance loss against permanent
risks in both rural and urban areas. Housing wealth, which is related to the urban housing reform
in 1994, is associated with an insurance loss against permanent risks in urban areas.
Third, we use a unified framework for growth, risk and insurance similarly to Lucas (1987)
in order to assess the welfare costs of growing with less insurance. We find these costs are
large. In particular, rural households would actually prefer living under the growth-risk-insurance
environment before the pro-market reforms than after the reforms, despite more growth in the
5See our Appendix.
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post-reform years.6 This suggests that currently the rural population is especially vulnerable to
risks, where the social insurance provision (e.g. welfare programs, work subsidies and health
insurance) has slowed down or disappeared. The case of urban households is different. The
urban households have benefited from a change in the composition of public transfers from
food coupons and work subsidies to pension income. This change decreases the co-movement
between household earnings and public transfers, providing extra cushion for insuring consumption
against shocks.7 In 2000s, the improvement in the insurance against transitory risks among urban
households is the main reason behind the welfare gain of the post-WTO environment relative to
the pre-WTO environment. Without public transfers urban households would also prefer the
pre-WTO growth-risk-insurance environment.
Economic growth is related to the process of structural transformation (Gollin et al., 2002,
2004) that inevitably involves migration decisions. Re-conducting our welfare analysis across rural
and urban areas, we explore how much risk and insurance affect the incentives to migrate along
the growth process. We find that rural-to-urban migration entails consumption insurance losses
that drop the welfare gains of migration by as much as 71% before the 2000s. However, an
increase in the amount of consumption insurance against transitory risk in urban areas in the
2000s substantially mitigates the loss in insurance and its effects on the incentives to migrate.
The improvement in the insurance against transitory risk in urban areas is directly related to the
composition of urban public transfers that shifts from being positively related to earnings in the
1990s (e.g. food coupons and other work subsidies) to negatively related to earnings in the 2000s
(e.g. pension income and welfare programs). Our analysis is related to the work of Harris and
Todaro (1970) and an emerging development literature that emphasizes the joint importance of
risk and insurance for migration decisions, see Bryan et al. (2014), Morten (2013), and Munshi
and Rosenzweig (2016).8 In our case, from a macroeconomic perspective, we take advantage
of a long panel of consumption and income for an economy that displays substantial growth
to investigate the evolution of the welfare gains from migration along the process of economic
growth. These gains largely increase with growth due to a change in the composition of public
transfers that improves insurance in urban areas.
Finally, as China rebalances towards a consumption-based economy and relies increasingly on
domestic demand, the GDP growth-targeting, which has for a long time dominated the policy
agenda since Deng Xiaoping’s growth reforms, is giving way to President Xi Jinping’s integrated
6These pro-market policies encompass urban housing reforms, SOE reforms in the late 1990s, and culminate
with the entrance of China in the WTO in 2001; see Section 2 for a detailed description.
7Fang (2014) provides a detailed description of insurance markets in China that includes pension income as
an important component of social insurance policy.
8See an earlier discussion in Rosenzweig and Stark (1989) in which migration patterns through marriages
across villages can help improve consumption insurance.
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approach that also values equity. In this direction, household income growth is recognized, for
the first time, alongside the GDP growth as the political target of the Communist Party of China.
Further, Premier Li Keqiang has repeatedly emphasized a “reasonable interval of growth which
sustains stable employment and stable price levels,” which some policy analysts view as preventive
measures against social unrest.9 These political statements represent the search for a combination
of growth-enhancing, risk stabilization and social insurance policies that preserve welfare, which
is particularly relevant if China faces a future scenario of lower income growth (Higgins et al.,
2016). We use our framework as a device to quantitatively assess the welfare implications of these
three policies jointly—unlike previous literature that almost invariably studies them in isolation
(see the discussion in Lucas (2003)).10
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the evolution of
institutions of social insurance in urban and rural China since Deng Xiaoping’s growth reforms in
the 1980s and the pro-market reforms in the late 1990s. In section 3, we describe the construction
of the panel of household consumption and income. Further, we establish key facts about the
evolution of rural and urban consumption and income inequality during the 20 years of economic
reforms in China. In section 4, we measure the degree of partial insurance in rural and urban
China. In section 5, we interpret these results with the additional information on investments
in children and housing wealth. In section 6, we conduct a welfare analysis of growth, risk and
insurance across time and space. Finally, in section 7, we conduct policy experiments that balance
the trade-offs between targets of growth, risk and insurance representing the potential political
tensions arising from future lower economic growth. Section 8 concludes.
2 Institutional Background in China 1989-2009
We begin by describing, in a highly parsimonious way, the growth model that China has taken
since 1989. After a brief experimentation with economic liberalism in the 1980s, in particular in
the rural areas, the Chinese government embarked on a highly controlled growth process in which
resources were mobilized from the subnational governments to the central government, from the
rural areas to urban areas and from the non-state to the state industrial sector.11 It channeled
public resources away from the township and village enterprises (TVEs), popular in the 80s in the
rural areas (Huang, 2008), and towards the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the cities (Song
9See Premier Li Keqiang’s government work report at the National People’s Congress in March 2014. He also
commented along these lines in his visit to the UK on July 2nd, 2014, spurring a wide range of speculation about
the upper and lower bound of the acceptable growth rates.
10A notable exception is Heathcote et al. (2014) that studies the joint effect of these three policies for the U.S.
11The central government “re-centralized” the tax revenue vis-a`-vis the subnational governments by way of the
1994 Tax Reform, while largely leaving the expenditure responsibilities with the latter (Bird and Wong, 2005).
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et al., 2011). Within the state sector in cities, to concentrate effort in modernizing industries,
the government strengthened the large state-owned enterprises by offering cheap loans and tax
breaks and privatized a large number of small and effectively bankrupt enterprises to cut down
loss. To facilitate the technological catch up, foreign investors with more advanced technologies
(than their Chinese counterparts) were let in (Reenen and Yueh, 2012; Holmes et al., 2013).
Millions of migrant workers, usually rural labor seeking off-farm work bound to their rural origin
by the Hukou registration system, kept the labor cost low. Overall, this centralized approach has
led to capital misallocation (Bai et al., 2006; Dollar and Wei, 2007; Hsieh and Klenow, 2009)
and income inequality (Benjamin et al., 2008; Park, 2008).12
How does this development policy shape the income growth and risk environment that rural
and urban households face? How does it affect consumption and welfare? Before moving on
to precise measures of risks, insurance and welfare, we briefly comment next. By 1990, the
agriculture output as a share of GDP had fallen from 40% in 1970 to 28%, while its employment
share had fallen from 81% in 1970 to 60%.13 This means off-farm work has been an important
source of income for rural households since 1989. In our sample, the agricultural income accounts
for less than 50% of the total rural disposable income throughout the sample period (see Table 2
for 2006 for example). Apart from the risks inherent in agricultural production such as weather
and input/output price risks, rural households are also, increasingly, subject to labor market and
business income risks. If a member of a rural household seeks employment from a local TVE, he
may face even higher risks than an urban employer working for an SOE given the deteriorating
business environment for TVEs after 1990. On the other hand, the local social safety net is
largely missing throughout our sample period. Since the Tax Reform, the county and township
governments, supposedly the providers of public education, health care, medical insurance and
infrastructure, have been paralyzed by fiscal imbalances. To solve their revenue problem, local
governments turned to rural residents for extra budget fees and converted public assets and land
to commercial uses, both of which essentially passed the financial burden onto rural households.
Since early 2000, extra budgetary fees are cut and the pilot programs of new medical insurance
scheme, social security and pension scheme are rolled out. Due to the limited coverage and scope
of these pilot programs, the rural households in our sample had highly restricted access to public
social insurance from 1989 to 2009.14
12See also the recent review in Fan et al. (2013).
13See Table 13.6 in Huang et al. (2005).
14The New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme (NRCMS) pilot program was rolled out in 2003 and achieved
almost full coverage in rural China in 2010, though the effectiveness of the medical scheme is questionable. See
for example, Wagstaff, A., Lindelow, M., Wang, S. and Zhang, S., “Reforming China’s Rural Health System”,
World Bank, Human Development (2009). The New Rural Social Security and Pension Scheme pilot program was
initiated in 2009. On February 10th, 2014, the State Council announced the move to unify the pension systems
for rural and urban residents in a meeting chaired by Premier Li Keqiang, paving the way for a unified factor
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In contrast, urban households have always enjoyed some public social insurance, though the
composition of the social safety net have changed during the period of investigation. Up until mid-
1990, urban residents enjoyed a relatively stable state employment in a “work unit”. The “work
unit” provided a whole spectrum of services to the employees, ranging from housing, maternal
care, child care, child education, and training to entertainment and health care. It distributed
subsidies for food, commuting, heating (in winter seasons) and so on. The funding of the services
and subsidies was partly from the work unit’s revenue and partly from the government. Urban
households faced relatively low income risks, and consumption was essentially guaranteed in an
administrative process. The SOE reforms shook this old model of “enterprises running social
programs” (qi ye ban she hui). To increase the profitability of the state sector, thousands of
small loss-making SOEs were shut down or sold and their employees were laid off,15 and the
remaining SOEs decreased their welfare spending on employees. Urban residents then not only
faced higher unemployment and income risks, but also had to foot the bill for housing, child
care and education and health service which had been given to them at low costs before. In
particular, since the 1994 urban housing reform, state-employed urban residents were offered
the opportunity to buy the apartments they had been renting from the state. This would later
become a major form of wealth as well as a major channel of wealth accumulation for many an
urban Chinese household. Meanwhile, the government started to build a social security system
that includes unemployment insurance, health insurance (for the working as well as non-working
urban residents) disability insurance and provision for retirement pensions.
The SOE reforms and the urban housing reforms that occurred in the late 1990s together
with the entrance of China in the WTO in 2001 form the most important collection of pro-market
reforms implemented by China in the 20-year period that we study. For simplicity, in our analysis
we will label the years before and after these pro-market reforms respectively as the pre-WTO
era and the post-WTO era.
These institutional features and reforms have an impact on the evolution of the household
income structure, in particular, in terms of the public transfers and their composition.16 We
compute the components of public transfers (i.e. food coupons, subsidies from work, subsidies
from government and pension income) and the private transfers as a fraction of total household
income from the CHNS and document their evolution in Figure 1. First, urban areas benefit more
from public transfers than rural areas. The public transfers, in the aggregate, account for about
10% of the household income for the rural households, whereas it accounts for a much higher
market across the urban and rural parts of China.
15More than 21 million urban workers were laid off from the SOEs between 1999 and 2005 according to the
official statistics released by the National Statistics Bureau.
16For data description and sample construction, refer to section 3.
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30% for the urban households (i.e. the orange lines in both panels). In comparison, the role
of private transfers is much less important for both rural and urban households throughout the
sample period (i.e. the yellow lines in both panels). Second, the composition of public transfers
has changed over time. Among the urban households, the role of subsidies for food in the form
of food coupons and subsidies from the work unit decline visibly (i.e. the purple and blue lines
in the urban sample). Meanwhile, the pension income becomes the major component of public
transfers over the sample period (i.e. the olive line in the urban sample).17
3 Consumption and Income Inequality: Evidence from the China Health
and Nutrition Survey 1989-2009
The China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) is an ongoing data project conducted jointly by
the Carolina Population Center at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the National
Institute of Nutrition and Food Safety at the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention.
It is a panel dataset that tracks about 4,000 households in rural and urban areas of China from
1989 to 2009. To the best of our knowledge, this is only publicly available household-level dataset
from China that spans a significant period of economic transition.
We use the eight waves of CHNS conducted in 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006
and 2009. The sample encompasses nine provinces at different stages of economic development
and with different natural endowments: Guangxi, Guizhou, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan,
Jiangsu, Liaoning and Shandong. In each province, a multistage random cluster process was
used to draw the sample.18 Each year there are about 200 primary sampling units (PSUs), one
third of which are in the urban area and two thirds in the rural area. Around 20 households
were interviewed per PSU. This brings about 4,000 households in each year of the survey. In
section 3.1, we briefly summarize the method we use to construct the household consumption
and income panel. In section 3.2, we document some stylized facts about the consumption and
income inequality in rural and urban China from the CHNS.
17From CHIP 1995 and 2002, the two waves that surveyed relatively completely the set of transfers, we do find
somewhat similar evidence. In both urban and rural areas, pension became the dominant form of public transfers.
In rural areas, the share of pension income in total public transfers increased from 59% to 82% from 1995 to
2002 and in urban areas, this figure increased from 90% to 94%. Finally, private transfers are less important, as
it is the case with CHNS.
18For more details of the the survey design, refer to the Design and Methods at the CHNS website:
www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/china.
9
3.1 Data
To study the degree of consumption insurance of Chinese households, we construct a panel of
household consumption and income (with or without transfers) from the CHNS. Here we briefly
discuss the construction of our measures of consumption, income, transfers, and household socio-
demographic characteristics.19
The major non-durable consumption item in our analysis is food consumption. We construct
household food consumption from the unique and highly detailed household-level dietary infor-
mation from the CHNS. The Nutrition Survey, an integral part of the CHNS, documents the
food items that a participating household consumes over a three-day window. The measurement
of food consumption combines physical measurement of food items with daily interviews. The
result is a highly detailed account of hundreds of types of food consumed on a daily basis, whose
precision is suitable for nutrition studies and medical research (Batis et al., 2014). This survey
design minimizes recall and telescoping error and can be considered as close as it gets to a ”gold
standard” for measuring consumption (Deaton and Zaidi, 2002; Beegle et al., 2010; Attanasio
et al., 2014).20 The dietary data was published from 1989 to 2009, which defines the time frame
of our sample. The nutrition survey is very comprehensive collecting consumption information for
636 food items from which nutrition intake information can be extracted. In addition to the food
quantity data, we obtain the local food prices from the Community Survey. Harmonizing across
the different categorizations used in the price and quantity data and across waves, we form the
annualized value of the diet of the households. In addition, we also include in the value of diet
the consumption of alcohol, tobacco, coffee and tea surveyed in the Household Survey but not in
the Nutrition Survey. Our measure of food consumption matches well with the official statistics
from the China Statistical Yearbooks (CSYBs) by year, province and urban or rural status.21 It
is important to note that throughout our exercise we focus on expenditure—also pricing home-
produced food consumption—and do not distinguish between food expenditure and consumption
(e.g. nutrient intake) as explored in Aguiar and Hurst (2005). We conduct robustness exercises
using caloric intake as our consumption measure.
The CHNS collects data on additional consumption items such as utilities, child care, health
19We relegate the step-by-step description of each of these measures to Appendix A.
20Recently, Attanasio et al. (2014) have used several techniques to overcome measurement error problems. One
proposed technique involves the use of consumption categories for which measurement error is known to be less
of an issue. Analogous to what we do here, one of such categories includes the use of data from the dietary
component of the Consumption Expenditures Surveys.
21While this is reassuring, it is important to note that our measure of food consumption is likely to be less
subject to measurement error than that from the CSYB which requires annual recalls of food expenditures; see
the paragraphs on “Food Expenditures” in Appendix A.4.1.
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expenditures, education expenditures, housing services, and semidurable supplies. Our measure of
household consumption includes, in addition to food, the consumption of utilities, health service
and semidurable supplies, items that are consistently surveyed in all waves.22 A look into the
consumption basket of a typical Chinese household reported in the CSYBs suggests that these
consumption items combined capture 60-70% of a rural household’s consumption basket and
50-60% of an urban household’s consumption basket.23
We construct measures of household income and transfers by source from the raw data. The
household income measure is the sum of labor market income, agricultural income, business
income and capital income, all after tax. The household transfer received consists of a public
and a private component. The public transfer consists of the value of food coupons (from 1989
to 1993 when the coupon system was abolished), subsidies from the work unit (such as grocery,
haircut and housing subsidies), subsidies from the government (such as utility and one-child
subsidies) and pension income.24 The private transfer consists of cash and in-kind gifts from
family and friends. The household disposable income is then the sum of the household income,
public transfers and private transfers received. While the CHNS does not capture transfers given,
the quantitative importance of private transfers is relatively minor compared with that of public
transfers, see our discussion in the previous section about Figure 1.
In terms of sample selection, we focus on households whose heads are from age 25 to age 65.
This criterion is somewhat different from what has been used in the U.S. consumption literature.
This is to accommodate the fact that the rural households, or about 70% of our sample, do not
have a well-defined retirement age. In addition, we purposefully include the self-employed in the
sample since most rural observations are of household farms. We exclude individuals with missing
income or consumption and observations that report no food consumption. All economic variables
are transformed to constant 2009 prices of urban Liaoning with the CHNS price deflator and then
to the US dollars. We trim the top and bottom 1% of all sub-items of household consumption,
income, and transfer measures and the household-level aggregates.25
22Our benchmark consumption measure excludes child care, as the child care expenditure is not available in year
2009. It also excludes housing service as it is only available from households that pay housing rent. See Appendix
A.4.3 and A.4.5. Our results from the estimation of the partial insurance model in section 4 are robust to the
introduction of child care expenditures and housing rents. We always exclude education expenditure, because it
is only available in year 2006.
23Table A-3 in the Appendix summarized the availability of sub-items of consumption and income across waves.
Table A-4 in the Appendix reports the proportion of the expenditure on items represented in CHNS (i.e. food,
durable supplies and health) in the total household expenditure from the CSYBs by year, province and urban
status.
24It is worth noting that we did not use the imputed household income aggregates supplied by the CHNS, which
we find has some serious data consistency issues, in particular in its non-retirement wage income. For a critique
on the readily available household income aggregate, see Appendix A.2.1.
25This level-trimmed sample is the basis for documenting the evolution of consumption and income inequality
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Table 1 summarizes some key sample household socio-demographic characteristics. Our panel
with replacement ages slightly from 1989 to 2009, with the average age increasing from 42 in
1989 to 49 in 2009. Households are predominantly headed by a male, especially so in rural areas.
The educational attainment of household heads improves over time, with the percentage of rural
household heads with no schooling decreasing from 13.6% in 1989 to 4.2% in 2009 and the
percentage of urban household heads going beyond middle school (or the 9th grade) increasing
from 36.9% in 1989 to 54.3% in 2009. In terms of household structure, the average household
size in rural areas increases from 4.31 in 1989 to 4.70 in 2009, while that in urban areas decreases
from 4.04 in 1989 to 3.70 in 2009. Consistent with the aging of the panel, the average weak
dependency ratio, defined as the number of children (age below 15) over the number of adults
(age above 15) decreases sharply from .48 in 1989 to .14 in 2009. The strong dependency ratio,
defined as the number of children and old adults (age above 60) over all working-age adults (age
between 15 and 60), also decreases from .66 to .32. In the rest of our empirical study, except
when explicitly noted, we use equivalent scales as in Krueger and Perri (2006) to control for
changes in the household composition.26
3.2 Cross-Sectional Facts
In this section, we document the joint evolution of consumption and income inequality using our
constructed measures from CHNS for the period 1989-2009. While earlier studies on China’s
inequality focus on the distribution of either income or consumption separately (Khan and Riskin,
1998; Wu and Perloff, 2004; Benjamin et al., 2008; Li et al., 2012; Liu and Li, 2011), in our
analysis we emphasize their joint dynamics.
over time in section 3.2. Since the estimation relies on the growth rates of residual income and consumption, to
arrive at the estimation sample, we further trim based on the growth rates. We first construct the adult-equivalent
household consumption and income (with and without transfers) from the level-trimmed data. Then we compute
(logged) adult-equivalent household consumption and income residuals by removing, separately for each wave and
area of residency, the effects of household characteristics that we consider permanent or pre-determined such as
sex, age, education, province, and the pertinence to a minority group. Then we trim the top and bottom 1% of
the growth rates of these consumption and income residuals and trim abnormal movements in growth rates for
two consecutive waves. We provide full justification of our sample selection and trimming strategy and visualize
the effects from each stage of trimming in Appendix B. The level-trimmed sample comprises on average 3,541
households per wave and the estimation sample comprises on average 2,215 households per wave.
26In the context of China, it is important to control for household composition as the interaction between co-
residing adult children and parents might provide additional sources of insurance (Rosenzweig and Zhang, 2014;
Oliveira, 2015). To compute the adult-equivalized disposable income, we divide by the number of working age
adults in the household (i.e. those with age between 15 and 60). To compute the adult-equivalized consumption,
we divide by the equivalence scales in Krueger and Perri (2006), defined as follows:
KP = [# of adults age greater than or equal to 15 + 0.7× (# of children age below 15)]0.7 .
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Consumption and income growth. In Figure 2, we plot the household disposable income
per capita and the household food expenditure per capita, conforming to the CSYB definitions
to facilitate comparison with official statistics.27 Both income and consumption grow more in
urban areas than in rural areas. In terms of disposable income per capita, we find a growth
factor of 3.4 in rural areas and of 4.2 in urban areas over the 20-year period (see the top panels
of Figure 2). Note that household income per capita growth is lower than the GDP per capita
growth (indicated by the dotted line), an observation also made by Khan and Riskin (1998)
from the China Household Income Project (CHIP) data. It is important to remember that what
matters to counteract the rising income inequality and risks, which we document below, is growth
in the household income, not necessarily GDP per capita. The top two panels show that the rural
and urban household per capita net income growth in the CHNS aligns well with the official
CYBS statistics. In terms of consumption per capita, we focus on food expenditures, its major
component. We find a growth factor of 4.1 in rural areas and of 5.8 in urban areas between 1989
and 2009 (see the bottom panels of Figure 2). Note that the time series of food expenditures
measures from CHNS also align well with the official CYBS statistics.
Consumption and income inequality. Table 2 gives an overview of the distribution of con-
sumption, earnings (i.e., income without transfers), and disposable income separately for rural
and urban areas in the 1989 and 2009 CHNS sample. The consumption gap between rural and
urban areas is relatively small, urban households enjoy more consumption than rural households
by a factor of 1.06 in 1989 and 1.10 in 2009. The income gap is larger and grows with time.
Urban households earn more disposable income than rural households by a factor of 1.39 in 1989
and 1.67 in 2009, a phenomenon that is partly generated by the increase in the transfers that
urban households receive relative to rural households over time, which we can see by exploring
the behavior of earnings. Urban earnings are higher than rural earnings by a factor of 1.04 in
1989 and 1.28 in 2009.28
Consumption inequality is clearly less severe than income inequality in both rural and urban
areas, which is suggestive of the presence of consumption insurance mechanisms in both rural
and urban areas. In year 1989, the bottom 20% of the rural (urban) income distribution enjoy
18.3% (16.9%) of the total rural (urban) aggregate consumption, while the top 20% enjoy 22.9%
27We subtract from the disposable income measure in the CHNS the value of food coupons and the in-kind
gifts to make it comparable to official statistics. The definition of disposable income in CSYB is household total
income minus taxes and fees paid, household operation expenses, depreciation of fixed assets for production and
gifts to other relatives. We subtract from the food expenditure measure in the CHNS the value of food coupons
and the food gifts to make it comparable to the official statistics. We apply the same deflator to both the CHNS
and the CSYB series and normalize the real values in 1989 to 1.
28On average, a rural household receives more transfers than an urban household by a factor of 4 in 1989 and
by a factor of 6 in 2009.
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(22.7%); see the top panels of Table 2. This implies that the top 20% roughly enjoy 1.3 times
more consumption that the bottom 20% in both rural and urban areas. The discrepancies are
larger for income. The bottom 20% of the rural (urban) income distribution earn 4.1% (7.7%) of
the total rural (urban) aggregate income, while the top 20% earn 45.2% (37.4%). This implies
that the rural (urban) top 20% roughly earn 10 (5) times more income that the bottom 20%.
Moreover, there is clear evidence of increasing inequality in both areas, and more so in income
than consumption; see the bottom panels of Table 2 for year 2009.
In Figure 3, we show the evolution of the raw disposable income and consumption inequality
and the inequality measures adjusted for household composition. As shown in the left panel,
in the rural sample the variance of logged raw disposable income increases from .8 in 1989 to
1.3 in 2009, which is about 3 times the size of its consumption inequality counterpart. Income
inequality in urban areas is a bit smaller than in rural areas with a variance starting about .35 in
1989 and rising to about 1 in 2009. In the urban areas, the variance of consumption is about half
that of income. The right panel shows the variance of income per worker and adult-equivalent
consumption normalized at zero in 1989. Rural and urban samples display similar patterns of
inequality with the variance of disposable income increasing by about .6 log points in the rural
areas and .8 log points in the urban areas. That is, compared to the raw data, the adult-equivalent
income inequality grows even more over time in urban areas than in rural areas. This is due to
the fact that the covariance between income and number of adults decreases more in the urban
areas than in the rural areas (see the middle panel). Regarding consumption, the variance of
adult-equivalent consumption in China has increased by .3 in 20 years in both rural and urban
areas. Both the level of income and consumption inequality as well as the growth are higher in
China than those obtained for the U.S. using the CPS data. Overall, the increase in the variance
of adult-equivalent income in the last 20 years in China is about two times the increase of its
counterpart in the U.S. from 1970 to 2005, while the increase in the variance of adult-equivalent
consumption is about three times its U.S. counterpart (see the top-left panel in Figure 13 in
Heathcote et al. (2010b)).29
29As a robustness check, we also compute the Gini index to describe inequalities (see Figure C-2 in the Ap-
pendix). The Gini of our adult-equivalent disposable income in rural areas increases from .40 in 1989 to .50 in
2009 and that in urban areas increases from .28 in 1989 to .44 in 2009. These numbers are similar to what Khan
and Riskin (1998) and Li et al. (2012) find from the 1988 and 1995 CHIP surveys and what Li et al. (2012) find
from the 2002 and 2009 CHIP surveys. The Gini of our adult-equivalent consumption in rural areas rises from .25
in 1989 to .35 in 2009, whereas that in urban areas rises from .27 in 1989 to .33 in 2009. That is, consumption
inequality is about 2/3 that of income inequality. This is in line with the Gini of the consumption surveyed in
the CHIP dataset reported by Liu and Li (2011). For a discussion, see the paragraph on “Gini coefficients” in
Appendix C.2. In contrast with previous literature, Cai et al. (2010) report, using the Urban Household Income
and Expenditure Survey (UHIES), a similar (and for some years even somewhat higher) inequality of consumption
compared with income inequality. We note that this is simply due to the fact that Cai et al. (2010) include
durables in their definition of household consumption. Indeed, using only nondurable consumption from the Ur-
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Residual (within-group) consumption and income inequality. Three main findings stand
out from our analysis.30 First, for both rural and urban households, the residual inequality explains
most of the evolution of consumption and income inequality, accounting for roughly 90% of the
overall inequality (see the left column in Figure 4).31 Second, residual income inequality grows
twice as much as that of consumption from 1989 to 2009. To see this, we normalize the residual
inequalities in 1989 to zero (see the middle column in Figure 4). Over time, the residual income
inequality rises by almost .6 log points in rural areas and about .7 log points in urban areas.
The residual consumption inequalities in rural and urban areas also rise, to about half the size
of the residual income inequalities. The fact that the residual income inequality keeps rising
indicates that both rural and urban households might be facing substantial permanent income
shocks throughout the 20 years. The fact that the residual consumption inequality rises less
than income inequality suggests that Chinese households have partial insurance, in the sense that
they can smooth out some of the income shocks but not all. Third, the covariance of residual
consumption and income more than triples over the span of 20 years (see the right column in
Figure 4). While the covariance remains relatively constant for the first four waves, it keeps rising
in the last four waves of the CHNS. In 2009, the covariance of residual income and consumption
is three times as high as the 1997 level in both rural and urban areas of China. This is the
first evidence that Chinese households are experiencing a deterioration in their ability to smooth
consumption despite the income growth, which our quantitative exercise will confirm next.32
4 Consumption Insurance in Rural and Urban China 1989-2009
In this section, we estimate a partial insurance model using our constructed panel of consumption
and income. This measures the size and time path of the variance of permanent and transitory
risk, as well as the degree of the ability of Chinese households to insure against each type of risk.
We present the model and the identification in section 4.1, and present the results in section 4.2.33
ban Household Survey (UHS), a subsample of the larger UHIES, we find that the adult-equivalent consumption
inequality is about one-third to one-quarter lower than the adult-equivalent income inequality for the period 1993
to 1997 for which those data are publicly available. We find similar figures when we use the Rural Household
Survey (RHS) for the period 1986 to 2000 for which those data are publicly available.
30We explain the computation of the residuals in footnote 24 in section 3.1.
31Krueger and Perri (2006) decompose the rise in U.S. consumption inequality and find that about half of the
rise in consumption inequality is due to residual (within-group) inequality.
32In Figure C-3 in Appendix C.2, we show that, in contrast, the covariance between residual consumption and
income is fairly flat from 1972 to 1992 in the United States.
33As a preliminary exercise, we also conducted a full set of complete market tests a` la Mace (1991) and
Townsend (1994) with various measures of consumption and income assuming both CRRA and exponential
utility. See Appendix G.
15
4.1 Measuring the Degree of Partial Insurance
We estimate a partial insurance model a` la Blundell et al. (2008) (henceforth, BPP). We regress
the (logged) adult-equivalent income and the (logged) adult-equivalent consumption measure on
dummies of sex, age, education level, province of residence and ethnic minority separately by
urban status and by year, and take the difference of the residuals. For each household, we have
the history of the (unexplained) income and consumption growth as inputs for the estimation.
The econometric model is annual and standard. The log (unexplained) annual income yt is
the sum of a permanent component zt and a transitory component εt, that is, yt = zt + εt. The
permanent component zt follows a random walk, zt = zt−1 + ζt. The shocks to the permanent
component as well as the transitory component are i.i.d. across time and households: ζt ∼
i.i.d.(0, σ2ζt) and εt ∼ i.i.d.(0, σ2εt).34
The measured log (unexplained) annual consumption growth ∆c∗t follows:
∆c∗t = ψζ,tζt + ψε,tεt + ξt + u
c
t − uct−1, (1)
where the preference shock ξt is distributed as i.i.d.(0, σ
2
ξt
) and the measurement errors in con-
sumption uct ∼ i.i.d.(0, σ2uct ). The loading factors ψζ,t and ψ,t measure the degree of transmission
of the two types of income shocks to consumption. They are interpreted as the insurance param-
eters against the permanent and transitory income shocks respectively. The higher the loading
factor or the transmission, the lower the insurance. Perhaps, the most relevant aspect is to note
that we allow for the variance of the income shocks and the partial insurance parameters to
change with time. This non-stationarity provides the flexibility to fit the data from the rapidly
growing economy of China, and allows us to study the joint dynamics between economic growth,
risk and insurance.
Note that even though the model is cast in terms of annual income and consumption, the data
points from the CHNS are not annual. To limit the number of parameters to be estimated, we
restrict the loading factors ψζ and ψε to be constant in the two subperiods, 1989-1997 and 1998-
2009. The dividing line is motivated by the observation from the movement of the covariance
of the residual consumption and income in Figure 4. In reality, the subperiod of 1989 to 1997
is one in which households still enjoyed relatively stable state employment and benefits, whereas
34The assumption of i.i.d. transitory shocks is motivated by the fact that the income data points are at least
two years apart. We estimated a set-up where the transitory component of the income process follows an MA(1):
yt = zt + vt, where vt = εt + θεt−1. We find that the persistence parameter θ is never significant and, hence, we
simply set θ = 0 in our benchmark estimation. The fact that θ is not significant help us rule out the possibility
that a deterioration in insurance (i.e., an increase in the loading factors) reflects a persistent transitory shock that
we are not modeling.
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the subperiod of 1998 to 2009 captures the effects of the reforms (i.e., urban housing, SOE
reforms, and the entry to the WTO) which fundamentally changed the economic lives of billions
of Chinese. We derive in Appendix D the identification of this annual model with a panel data
set that has unevenly spaced survey dates and lay down the estimation procedure. The bottom
line is as long as the sum of the variances of the permanent shocks is identified as a block,
neither the identification nor the interpretation of the insurance parameters is affected by the
unevenly spaced data. The model is estimated by the Diagonally Weighted Minimum Distance
Estimator. In the subsequent tables of the estimation results, we report the sum of the variances
of permanent shocks in between survey dates and the variance of transitory shocks in the survey
year, the loading factors in the two sub-periods, the taste parameter and the measurement errors
in consumption. Asymptotic standard errors are in the parentheses.35,36
4.2 Estimation Results and the Role of Public and Private Transfers
We estimate the partial insurance model using our benchmark measures of consumption and
disposable income (i.e. earnings with both public and private transfers). Our main finding is that
the ability to insure consumption against income risks has declined in both rural and urban areas,
at the same time that income risks themselves have increased along the growth path.
In terms of income risks, both permanent and transitory risks increase across time, with a
larger increase in urban areas (see the ’Disposable Income’ columns in Table 3). More specifically,
for rural (urban) households, the annualized variance of permanent shocks has increased from an
average of .0913 (.0488) before 1997 to .1170 (.0887) after 1997, implying a 28% (82%) increase,
while the annualized variance of transitory shocks has increased from an average of .3862 (.1999)
before 1997 to .4504 (.2704) after 1997, implying a 17% (35%) increase.37 Across space, the
rural households consistently face higher levels of permanent risks (and transitory risks) than the
35As a robustness check, we simulate our estimated benchmark model for 5,000 rural and urban households
separately for 21 periods (i.e. 1989-2009) and verify that the variance covariance structure in the simulated
data matches well that in our estimation sample. The estimates of the key moments from the simulated and
original data with the standard errors are reported in Table E-1 in the Appendix. The estimates of the entire
auto-covariance structure of income and consumption growth by survey year are reported in Tables E-2 to E-5 in
the Appendix.
36In this paper, we choose to adopt the restricted income profile, an industry standard in the consumption
literature (Blundell et al., 2008; Heathcote et al., 2014), to measure income risk. Importantly, we further allow
the level of income risk and the degree of insurance to vary with time, i.e., with growth. An alternative modeling
choice is the heterogeneous income profile with learning over own income growth pioneered by Guvenen (2007)
and Guvenen and Smith (2014). The implications on consumption insurance of the uncertainty of own income
growth in a non-stationary setting, i.e. along a growth process, is an interesting and challenging question that we
leave for future research.
37The reported variance of the permanent risks in Table 3, to be consistent with the standard errors, is the
sum of variances in between the survey dates. For example, a variance of .2238 for the rural sample in 1992-93
indicates an annualized variance of .1119 for the years of 1992 and 1993.
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urban households respectively by an average factor of 1.5 (and of 1.8).
In terms of insurance, both rural and urban households experience a worsening of insurance
against the permanent risks from before 1997 to after 1997 (see the ’Disposable Income’ columns
in Table 4). The loading factor ψζ , which captures the percentage of permanent risks that is
transmitted to consumption, increases from .1207 to .2968 for rural households and from .0766
to .2200 for urban households. This implies an increase in the loading factor for the rural and
urban households by, respectively, a factor of roughly 3. As to the insurance against the transitory
risks, rural households achieve virtually perfect insurance throughout the sample period, whereas
urban households’ ability to insure improves from a ψε of .2116 to .0608. This implies that
while the insurance against permanent risks is similar for rural and urban areas, rural areas insure
significantly better against transitory risks.38
To investigate the roles played by transfers on these insurance results across time and across
space, we re-estimate the model with three alternative measures of income: earnings with private
transfers, earnings with public transfers and earnings only. For the rural households, regardless
of which income measure we use, the degree of transmission of permanent shocks shows similar
deterioration over time, and the measured degree of transmission of transitory shocks is virtually
nil throughout the sample period. The robustness of this result is not surprising given the little
significance transfers have in the composition of household disposable income in rural China.39
In contrast, for the urban households, the public transfers have been a significant component
of income for urban households throughout the sample period. In addition, the nature of the
public transfers has changed over time. Public transfers in the early 90s, especially the subsidies
from the work unit, are essentially a part of earnings. Urban households whose wage income is
higher are also likely to receive a higher subsidy from their work unit, whether it be food coupons
or subsidies for daily supplies or service (section 2). As the government function evolves, public
transfers increasingly play the role of social insurance, such as pension and medical insurance, as
well as welfare assistance. As a result, the public transfers received by urban households become
less and less correlated with earnings or even negatively correlated with earnings over time (see
Table F-1 in Appendix C.2). This has consequences for our results in urban areas.
38In the same direction as Aguiar and Hurst (2005), when we use caloric intake as our measure of consumption
we find that the overall amount of consumption insurance is larger. Interestingly, when we use caloric intake as
our measure of consumption the loss of consumption insurance over time is of similar size as the one that we find
for expenditure.
39From 1989 to 2009, the percentage of rural households that have reported a positive amount of public transfer
decreased from 33% to 23%. The same figures for the urban residents are 94% and 60%. In terms of size, as
a share of the aggregate income, the public transfers in the rural areas averages at about 10% while that in the
urban areas averages at 30%, over the sample period (Figure 1). The private transfers as a share of aggregate
income is only 2% in both rural and urban areas.
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First, in terms of insurance against permanent risks in urban areas, the exclusion of public
transfers significantly decreases (increases) the permanent income inequality before 1997 (after
1997). This implies, for a given consumption series, a higher (lower) loading factor before 1997
(after 1997) than the benchmark values (see columns under “Earnings + Private Transf.” in
Table 3 and 4). The urban point estimates for ψζ are 0.1219 and 0.0704 for respectively before
and after 1997. That is, public transfers tend to generate a loss of insurance against permanent
risks over time in urban areas (see columns under “Earnings + Public Transf.” in Table 4), while
private transfers have the opposite effect. The overall effect is captured by “Earnings Only”, the
measure of income that removes both public and private transfers. Without transfers we find
no major changes in the ability to insure against permanent risks in urban areas over the entire
sample. This implies that with “Earnings Only” rural households are twice more able to insure
permanent shocks before 1997 than urban households (respectively compare the estimates 0.1082
and 0.2038), while the opposite occurs after 1997 where rural households are less able to insure
permanent shocks than urban households (respectively compare 0.2796 and 0.1788),
Second, in terms of insurance against transitory risks in urban areas, the result of a low
insurance in urban pre-1997 China (compared with post 1997), holds only in the two specifications
that have public transfers (see columns under “Disposable Income” and “Earnings + Public
Transf.” in Table 4). This implies that urban areas suffer a deterioration of consumption insurance
against transitory risks (see columns under “Earnings + Private Transf.” and “Earnings Only”
in Table 4) that is only mitigated by public transfers. To understand this result, recall public
transfers in the early 1990s are akin to in-kind transfers, and hence cannot be effectively saved for
future consumption. Specifically, food coupons can only be applied to the purchase of designated
food items and are valid for one year and utility subsidies must be deducted directly from the
utility bill. This essentially imposes a savings constraint for households entitled to large public
transfers in the 90s. As a result, consumption covaries positively and significantly with public
transfers in the early 1990s (see Table F-1 in Appendix C.2). To put our intuition to the test, we
reestimate the model with a measure of consumption that excludes the value of food coupons and
the subsidy for utility as well as a measure of income that includes the earnings and the cash public
transfers only, i.e. the welfare assistance and pension income. Now the urban households achieve
almost perfect insurance against transitory shocks before 1997 and a similar loss of insurance
after 1997, with a ψε,pre97 of .0709 (s.e. .0587) and a ψε,post97 of .1042 (s.e. .0505).
40
To put our estimates in perspective, we compare our results with those in BPP. BPP obtain
for the U.S. from 1979 to 1992 a loading factor of .6423 (s.e. .0945) for the permanent shocks
and .0533 (s.e. .0435) for the transitory shocks using family disposable income and nondurable
40For the complete set of estimates, see Table F-2 in the Appendix.
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consumption. This way, the insurance against permanent shocks in the China appears to be
higher than that in the US when, in fact, it is not. The main reason is that the major component
of our consumption measure for China is food consumption, whereas this is not the case for
the benchmark measure of nondurables in BPP. As BPP show, this has important implications
for their results. Using only food consumption implies a lower degree of transmission of income
risks to consumption. When only food consumption is considered, BPP find the transmission of
permanent income risks is .29 in the US, which resembles our estimates for post-reform China.
Hence, to the extent that the nondurable budget elasticity of food consumption tends to decline
over time, the increase in the transmission from income risk to consumption that we estimate
for China along its growth process is a lower bound of the actual deterioration of consumption
insurance. For example, Aguiar and Hurst (2014) find food consumption inequality (in particular,
home-produced food) is flat over the life cycle and attribute increases in inequality of life-cycle
expenditures to other categories of nondurable consumption.41 To put it differently, if we observe
a compromise in insuring food consumption in an environment where food consumption becomes
increasingly a necessity, we would expect the consumption of other non-durable items to respond
even more to income shocks.
In sum, Chinese households can partially insure against permanent shocks, a finding consistent
with the results in Attanasio and Davis (1996), Blundell et al. (2008), Kaplan and Violante (2010)
and Heathcote et al. (2014) for the U.S., and they can insure better transitory shocks than
permanent shocks, in particular if we remove the in-kind transfers. What sets our results apart
from previous studies is that we show the ability to insure income shocks worsens considerably
with economic growth.42 First, the transmission from permanent income shocks to consumption
triples in rural and urban China in the last 20 years. Second, the ability to insure against transitory
shocks also significantly worsens in urban areas, but this loss is almost entirely mitigated with
public transfers. Whether the welfare gains from growth are able to offset the welfare costs
of higher risk and lower ability to insure in China is a question that we investigate in section 6.
Before that, we investigate potential mechanisms behind our insurance results in the next section.
41In addition, we use adult-equivalent income and consumption measures, whereas BPP consider family net
income and consumption (controlling for household structure in their computations of respective residuals). When
only male earning is considered, BPP find a loading factor of permanent risks of .2245.
42In Appendix H, we also explore the relationship between growth, risk and insurance cross-sectionally for
communities with different growth rates. Our results suggest that communities that display higher growth are
associated with increasing risks and a substantial worsening of the ability to insure, which are consistent with our
benchmark estimation results.
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5 Theoretical Interpretations of Insurance Behavior
In a country known for its high household savings rates, it is natural to ask whether savings
help fend off household income risks.43 In this section, we explore how two well-known forms
of life-cycle savings that are predominant for Chinese families, investment in children (Banerjee
et al., 2014) and housing wealth (Wang, 2011; Wei and Zhang, 2011)—which potentially crowd
out precautionary saving, help understand our main result in section 4.2 that shows a clear
deterioration of consumption insurance against permanent risk.
5.1 Investment in Children
The notion of life-cycle savings, in its original form and in an exposition for China by Modigliani
and Cao (2004), is that households save for retirement. In the absence of a well-functioning
pension system in China, children have traditionally been considered as the old age security. In
this context, the One-Child Policy that restricts the number of children a family can have can
trigger both a quantity-for-quality trade-off (Rosenzweig and Zhang, 2009) and higher savings
as households postpone consumption to make up for fewer future income providers when old
(Banerjee et al., 2014).44 In this section, we recognize the intensive margin of investment in
children, i.e. the expenditure on education, as a form of life-cycle savings and ask how the
strength of this form of savings affects the degree of consumption smoothing.
To measure investments in children, we compute the education-expenditure-to-saving ratio
in 2006 and group those households whose ratio is above (or below) the median as high (or
low) investment households.45 Note that our measure of savings is the difference between the
household disposable income and benchmark consumption, the latter of which does not include
43Precautionary motives based on prudence (Kimball, 1990; Carroll and Kimball, 1996), on impatience (Carroll,
1997) or on institutions that impede borrowing (Deaton, 1991; Aiyagari, 1994; Rios-Rull, 1995; Huggett, 1996;
Carroll and Kimball, 2001) raise savings in response to higher income risk. As documented in the previous section,
China has seen an increase in unanticipated income changes in both rural and urban areas, which can potentially
help explain the rise of household savings in China. For example, Meng (2003) discusses an increase in savings
associated with the increased predicted risk of unemployment and the increased past income uncertainty during
the state-owned enterprise (SOE) reforms in the late 1990s. Chamon et al. (2013) find an increase in the savings
rates of young urban households that they attribute to an increase in labor income uncertainty; see also Yu and
Zhu (2013) for a discussion of an increase in uncertainty in household income using CHNS imputed income data.
More recently, He et al. (2013) study the SOE reforms in the late 1990s in urban China, finding a subsequent
increase in financial wealth accumulation.
44See Qian (2009) for a discussion on the potential complementarities between quantity and quality as the
family size changes with the relaxation of the One-Child Policy.
45The education expenditure is only surveyed in the 2006 wave of the CHNS. In the CHNS data, the education
expenditure as a share of household income is 12.2% (9.94%) in rural (urban) areas in 2006. In the CHIP dataset,
this ratio increases from 8.15% (5.75%) in 1995 to 13.35% (8.95%) in 2002 in rural (urban) areas. These pieces
of evidence portray a general increase in the investment in child’s education.
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education expenditures. The idea is that households that spend a higher fraction of their savings
on educating their children will have less of a buffer against income shocks.46
The partial insurance estimates are found in Table 5. Households whose investments in chil-
dren are low do not experience a deterioration in the ability to insure against permanent shocks
over time, while those households whose investment in children is high show a clear deterioration
in both rural and urban areas. In the rural areas, while ψζ shows no significant change over time
for households with low investments in children, this loading factor increases significantly from
.1331 in the pre-1997 years to .5260 in the post-1997 years for households with high investments
in children. Similarly, for urban households, this loading factor is never significantly different
from zero for households with low investment in children, while it increases from virtually per-
fect insurance in the pre-1997 years to .5124 in the post-1997 years for households with high
investments in children. That is, in both rural and urban areas , high investment in children is
clearly associated with the deterioration of the insurance against permanent shocks attained in
our benchmark results. Our results suggest that it is unlikely that Chinese households give up
investments in children for a better insurance against permanent risk.47
5.2 Housing Wealth
The housing reform implies that since 1994 urban households have a new avenue to invest their
wealth (section 2). Since then, housing wealth has become the most important form of savings
for Chinese households. This way, the housing wealth (net of debt) accounts for 68.1% of total
net worth in urban areas in 2011. This share is about 3 times larger than that obtained for the
U.S. (see Table 7 in D´ıaz-Gime´nez et al. (2011)).48 But houses are relatively illiquid assets that
46We also repeated this exercise using the expenditure on child care, available from 1989 to 2006. Here we
qualify a household with high investment in child care a household whose expenditure-to-saving ratio is above
median in any given survey year. We obtain similar insights.
47While our focus is on permanent risk, we also find that investments in children do not affect the insurance
against transitory shocks which in rural areas is always high and in urban areas is somewhat moderate. This is
consistent with our results in the previous section that show that public transfers almost entirely mitigate the loss
of insurance against transitory earnings shocks.
48While in rural areas housing wealth has always been an important component of household wealth, the 1994
urban housing reform which privatized the state-owned housing and established private housing markets set in
motion a rapid accummulation of housing wealth among urban households. From the China Household Finance
Survey (CHFS), housing wealth (net of debt) accounts for 82.1% of total net worth in rural areas and 68.1%
in urban areas in 2011. These shares are about 3 times larger than those obtained for the U.S. (see Table 7 in
D´ıaz-Gime´nez et al. (2011)). Most notably, the financial wealth is still a relatively minor component of household
wealth in China. The ratio of housing wealth to financial wealth in the CHFS is 7.55 in 2011 and 6.57 in 2013
(see the CHFS staff report: http://econweb.tamu.edu/gan/April-2014-English.pdf). Using a third data
source, CHIP, we find that this ratio of housing wealth to financial wealth is 11.17 and 5.34, respectively, for
rural and urban areas in 1995 and 8.67 and 5.39, respectively, for rural and urban areas in 2002. In our dataset,
the percentage of home ownership in rural areas has varied from 91.6% in 1989 to 96.3% in 2009 and that in
urban areas has increased rapidly from 45.7% in 1989 to 89.2% in 2009. The CHNS surveys home ownership and
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are less likely to be used to insure consumption. It is interesting then to investigate whether this
mechanism helps explain the loss of consumption insurance in urban areas.
Our results are in Table 6. Perhaps not surprisingly, in rural areas, where the housing reform
did not occur, we do not find differences across housing-wealth groups. Dividing our sample into
low and high housing-wealth (i.e., respectively, below and above the median housing wealth), we
find that both groups display a deterioration in the insurance against permanent risk, increasing
the loading factor ψζ roughly by a factor three. That is, the life-cycle savings in the form of
housing do not contribute to the consumption insurance deterioration in rural areas and, hence,
the investments in children play the main role in that deterioration as per our results in Section 5.1.
The interesting scenario is that of urban areas, i.e., where the housing reform occurred. In ur-
ban areas, high housing-wealth households experience a clear loss of insurance against permanent
risk between the pre-1997 years with a non-significant loading factor, ψζ , and the post-1997 years
with a significant ψζ of .3980. This is definitely not the case for low housing-wealth households
that show no significant change in their ability to insure against permanent risk over time. That
is, housing wealth constitutes a reasonable argument behind the loss of insurance in urban areas
attained in our benchmark results for urban areas. This argument does not apply to rural areas,
where the housing reform did not occur.
The role of housing on consumption insurance has been recently emphasized in Kaplan et al.
(2014). In the U.S. and other developed countries wealthy hand-to-mouth (HtM) households,
those with a wealth portfolio largely based on housing, are less able to insure against transitory
risk than wealthy households with a more liquid portfolio. Their reason to focus on transitory
(“small”) shocks is the notion that for permanent (“big”) shocks wealthy HtM would actually
sacrifice their housing wealth to insure their consumption. Our evidence does not support this
idea for China. Chinese households are not willing to give up their housing wealth for better
insurance against permanent shocks. This is perhaps not surprising for two reasons. First, the
largely underdeveloped finance sector for households in China limits the availability to store wealth
in liquid assets (Storesletten and Zilibotti, 2014), which makes Chinese households more likely
to hold on to houses as almost the only effective form of storing wealth.49 Second, Chinese
households have large incentives to invest in housing given the rise in the housing price after the
the value of residential units in all waves. For a discussion of data construction, see Appendix A.4.3. The home
ownership in China is high, considering the U.S. home ownership rate of 65% in the fourth quarter of 2013 (see
“Residential Vacancies and Homeownership in the Fourth Quarter 2013”, U.S. Census Bureau News).
49That is, while savings constraints can be present in a development context (Dupas and Robinson, 2013;
Kaboski et al., 2014; deMagalhaes and Santaeula`lia-Llopis, 2015), the high savings rates in China appears to
suggest the absence of such constraints. However, the limitation to diversify a wealth portfolio can itself be
considered as a saving constraint in growing economies with under-developed financial markets.
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housing reform (Wang, 2011) and the motivation for holding houses for its large returns in the
marriage market (Wei and Zhang, 2011; Du and Wei, 2013).50
To summarize, a high savings rate does not necessarily indicate better insurance. One needs
to look deeper at where the savings go in order to discuss consumption insurance. Our evidence
suggests that in China, where the financial market is underdeveloped and households have limited
options for storing wealth, the predominant life-cycle savings in the form of investments in children
and housing are associated with the loss of consumption insurance against permanent income
risk. Our results suggest that investments in children play an important role in both rural and
urban areas. The role of housing wealth is restricted to urban areas, i.e., where the housing
reform occurred.
6 Welfare Effects of Growth, Risk and Insurance in China 1989-2009
Since China is growing at the cost of higher risk and worse insurance, an accurate welfare as-
sessment requires taking into account the welfare impacts of all three components, growth, risk
and insurance. In this section, we first evaluate the welfare impact of these three components
over the entire sample period separately in section 6.1. Then we examine what changes in these
components from the 1990s to 2000s imply for changes in the welfare levels across time in section
6.2. Finally, we explore the spatial differences in growth, risk and insurance between rural and
urban China, and assess the scope of welfare gains from migration in section 6.3.
To answer these questions, we compute consumption equivalent variations as in Lucas (1987).
That is, we compute the percentage change in annual consumption g across all periods and
possible states of the world that a household in a reference environment A requires to be ex-
ante indifferent between A and a counterfactual environment B. The reference environment A is
defined by our estimates for the growth, γ, the amount of permanent and transitory risks, {σζ , σε},
and the degree of partial insurance against the permanent and transitory risks, {ψζ , ψε}.51 The
alternative environment B is then defined by the counterfactual in question, where one or more
parameters of the environment, {γ, σζ , σε, ψζ , ψε}, are changed. We report results for three levels
of risk aversion, η = 1, 2, 4, all of which are standard in the literature.52
50See also Wang and Wen (2012) who examine the effect of rising housing prices on savings rates under a
realistic mortgage down payment structure.
51For notational convenience, we drop the time subscript, but note that risk and insurance parameters are
time-varying.
52The methodology of welfare assessments is standard and hence relegated to Appendix I.1. In brief, we
start by computing from the initial income level and the household income growth rate an optimal deterministic
consumption plan in a savings model. Then we simulate the partial insurance model to obtain fluctuations in
consumption around the aforementioned deterministic consumption plan. The addition of the deterministic and
the stochastic components is the final consumption path which we evaluate with a time-separable CRRA utility
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6.1 The Welfare Effects of Growing with Risk
What are the overall welfare impacts of growth, risk and insurance for rural and urban China?
How do they compare to the U.S.? Here we evaluate the welfare gain from growth, the welfare
cost of risk and of partial insurance for China, using the sample and estimates of our benchmark.
We then conduct the same exercise for the U.S, using the sample and estimates from BPP.
The results are found in Table 7. In the first set of three columns in Table 7, the welfare gain
from growth are expressed as the consumption reductions, in percentage terms, that make our
households indifferent between their reference scenario with growth, {γ, σζ , σε, ψζ , ψε}, and the
counterfactual with no growth, {0, σζ , σε, ψζ , ψε}. Removing an annual income growth of 4.8%
in rural China amounts to a reduction of 37.77% of a rural resident’s annual consumption, while
removing an annual income growth of 5.7% in urban China amounts to a reduction of 43.42%
of its annual consumption. In other words, income growth by itself brings about substantial
improvements in welfare in China. This is independent of the degree of the risk aversion. For the
U.S., the gain from growth is smaller at about 18.22% of annual consumption for a growth rate
that is slightly under 3% from 1978 to 1992.
In the second set of columns, we report the annual consumption variation that households
growing with risk would need to be compensated with in order to be indifferent between their
reference scenario and the counterfactual with no risk, {γ, 0, 0, ψζ , ψε}. This counterfactual
describes an extreme stabilization policy that shuts down both the permanent and transitory risks.
Alternatively, shutting down risk in this exercise is isomorphic to providing perfect insurance, i.e.
{γ, σζ , σε, 0, 0}. Another way of interpreting the results is that they represent the welfare gain
from completing markets.53 The welfare cost of risk or welfare gain from full insurance depends
on the level of risk aversion. For η = 1, the welfare cost of risk is 1.69% of annual consumption
for rural China and 3.99% for urban China, while this figure is 3.30% for the U.S. For η = 2, the
magnitude of the welfare cost of risk increases by a factor of more than 2 to 4.06% and 8.94%,
respectively, for rural and urban China, and to 6.70% for the U.S. With η = 4, one needs to
increase the annual consumption by 14.58% and 27.68% in rural and urban China respectively to
match the level of welfare without income risk. This figure is 15.99% for the U.S.54 In sum, the
welfare cost of risk is twice as much in urban China as it is in rural China, and large in absolute
function. The ensuing experiments entail changing the income growth rate, the variances of the permanent or
transitory income shocks or the risk transmission parameters in an alternative scenario, evaluating welfare under
the alternative scenario and solving for consumption equivalent variations in the alternative which match the
welfare level in the reference scenario.
53Note that in these two counterfactuals, the consumption is still random because of the taste shock.
54This nonlinearity of the consumption variation in the coefficient of risk aversion is also present in Storesletten
et al. (2001).
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terms, accounting for roughly 1/7 (2/7) of rural (urban) annual consumption.
Last, we ask how would an agent in the reference scenario assess living in a world with neither
growth nor risks (or equivalently with no growth and perfect insurance), i.e., a stagnant life from
cradle to grave. This corresponds to an extreme interpretation that all risks are generated by
the growth process—i.e., giving up risks also implies giving up growth. The results are in the
last set of columns of the same table. The welfare cost is 36.7% of their annual consumption
for rural residents and 41.16% for urban residents with η = 1. These costs decrease to 28.70%
and 27.76% with η = 4. Hence, conditional on the ability to insure, it is still the case that for
the overall period of 1989 to 2009 Chinese households gain substantially from growing with risk,
though the magnitude of the gain from growth per se can drop by as much as 24% for rural and
by 36% for urban residents for η = 4.
6.2 Welfare Across Time: Pre- Versus Post-WTO
The entrance to the WTO is associated with a process with faster growth as well as higher
permanent risk and worse ability to insure for rural and urban Chinese households (see section 4.2).
Here we quantify the cumulative effects of post-WTO growth, risk and insurance on welfare.
We start from the pre-WTO economic environment or the reference scenario defined by
{γpre, σpre, ψpre} and successively replace the growth rate, the variances of shocks and the in-
surance parameters with their post-WTO counterparts.55 We repeat this exercise for two initial
conditions, cpre0 where we keep the initial consumption level in 1989 in the counterfactuals, and
cpost0 where we use the initial consumption level in 2000 in the counterfactuals.
56 We also conduct
this welfare exercise with two sets of data and estimates, one with the disposable income and the
other with the earnings. The results are found in Table 8.
Focus on the results using disposable income in Table 8(a). First, replacing the pre-WTO
growth rate of 4.43% (4.96%) for rural (urban) households with the post-WTO growth rate of
5.20% (6.71%), i.e. moving from {γpre, σpre, ψpre} to {γpost, σpre, ψpre}, certainly improves wel-
fare, especially for urban households. It amounts to an increase of 4.37% of annual consumption
in rural China and 10.31% of annual consumption in urban China from the reference scenario. A
simultaneous increase in the initial consumption to the post-WTO level enhances these gains to
40.90% in rural and 50.02% in urban areas.
Second, when we introduce the post-WTO risk into the environment while keeping insurance
55We compactly write σ = {σζ , σε} and ψ = {ψζ , ψε}. That is, we consider simultaneous changes in permanent
and transitory components of risk and insurance.
56As is revealed in the data, cpost0 /c
pre
0 is 1.35 in rural areas and 1.36 in urban areas.
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at the pre-WTO level, i.e. {γpost, σpost, ψpre}, the picture then looks very different for rural
and urban areas. In rural areas, the welfare gain from growing with risk is 3.16% of annual
consumption in the reference scenario with η = 4 and initial consumption at the 1989 level,
which is just slightly lower than the 4.37% gain from growth without changing the risk factors. In
contrast, growing with risk in urban areas entirely overturns the welfare gain from growth alone
and imposes a cost of 6.57% of annual consumption. This welfare cost of growing with risk for
the urban households is present for all levels of risk aversion with cpre0 . Apart from the fact that
the increase in risk is more pronounced from pre- to post-WTO period in urban areas than in
rural areas, the urban residents are much less able to insure against the higher transitory risk with
the pre-WTO insurance technology.57 This explains why the cost of introducing post-WTO risk
is so much higher in urban areas.
Third, we now add the actual post-WTO insurance technology to our welfare analysis,
{γpost, σpost, ψpost}. We find sharp differences between rural and urban areas again. In ur-
ban areas, the improvement in the insurance against transitory risk more than offsets the loss
in the insurance against permanent risk and substantially improves the welfare. With η = 4,
having the post-WTO level of insurance amounts to a 21.33% increase of annual consumption
from the reference scenario for the urban residents. Instead, in rural areas, the worsening of the
insurance against permanent risk in the post-WTO era implies a significant welfare loss of 9.05%
of annual consumption for η = 4. That is, the loss of insurance in rural areas is so large that it
more than offsets any gain from post-WTO growth. In this case, rural households would prefer
to live the growth-risk-insurance environment of the pre-WTO era. If we give them the initial
level of consumption in 2000, then the welfare gain from adopting the post-WTO growth, risk
and insurance becomes positive.
The welfare results from using the earnings measure, which are found in Table 8(b), are
broadly consistent with the findings using the disposable income measure. It is noteworthy,
however, that giving the urban households the post-WTO earnings growth, earnings risk and
insurance implies a welfare loss of 4.28% when η =4 and initial consumption is at the 1989 level.
In other words, once transfers are excluded, even the urban residents would prefer the growth-risk-
insurance environment of the pre-WTO era. The insurance against transitory risk has improved
in the post-WTO era with transfers, which is responsible for the positive gain observed with the
disposable income measure.
The overall results are clear. First, post-WTO growth, risk and insurance implies a welfare
57Recall from section 4.2, the transmission of the permanent risk is 0.1207 for the rural residents and 0.0772
for the urban residents, while the transmission of the transitory risk is effectively zero for the rural residents and
0.2111 for the urban residents.
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loss for rural households generated by the post-WTO worsening in the ability to insure against
permanent risks that more than offsets the welfare gains from the post-WTO growth. Second,
urban households also face welfare losses from post-WTO growth-risk-insurance environment
when we exclude transfers, while the introduction of transfers largely increases their welfare.
6.3 Welfare Across Space: Migrating from Rural to Urban Areas
Here, we directly compare the welfare of rural and urban areas to explore the incentives of rural-to-
urban migration by embedding the rural households with, one by one, the properties of the urban
households, i.e., consumption level, growth, risk and insurance. To explore how the evolution
of public transfers—i.e., direct changes in social insurance—affects the incentive to migrate, we
separately explore the welfare gains of migrating from rural to urban areas before and after China’s
entrance to WTO. As described in section 4.2, while rural and urban households share similar
ability to insure against permanent income shocks, urban areas show a substantially worse ability
to insure transitory shocks than rural areas for the years before 2000, although this is largely
mitigated through the changes in the composition of public transfers in the 2000s.
First, what are the welfare effects of urban growth on rural households? We define the
reference environment by the estimates from the rural sample, i.e. {γr, σr, ψr}, against the
counterfactual that introduces urban growth, i.e., {γu, σr, ψr}, and we do this separately for
before and after WTO. Before WTO, rural disposable income growth is on average 4.43% and
urban growth is 4.96%. The welfare gains from urban growth on rural households is 2.98% of
annual consumption under the initial level of rural consumption, cr0, see the first “Growth” column
in panel (a.1) of Table 9.58 After WTO, rural growth is on average 5.20% and urban growth is
6.71%, i.e., a larger rural-urban gap than before WTO, which implies larger welfare gains from
urban growth on rural households, 6.24% of annual consumption under cr0, see the first “Growth”
column in panel (a.2) of Table 9. Additionally providing rural households with the initial level
of urban consumption, cu0 , boosts the welfare gains to 9.68% before WTO and to 14.53% after
WTO.
Second, what are the welfare effects of urban growth and risk on rural households? This is
the case where rural households inherit not only urban growth but also its risk. That is, our
counterfactual is now {γu, σu, ψr}. Urban permanent and transitory risks are both about 60%
of those of rural areas (see section 4.2). If the rural insurance technology is preserved, then this
decrease in risk associated with urban households should increase our counterfactual rural welfare.
58To isolate the effects of growth, risk and insurance from consumption-level effects, we conduct this exercise
separately for the initial level in rural areas cr0 and the initial level in urban areas c
u
0 in 1989, where c
u
0/c
r
0 =1.06,
as is revealed in the data.
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Indeed, ignoring level effects, rural households gain 3.28% of annual consumption for η = 1 and
4.00% for η = 4 before WTO, see the first “Risk” column in panel (a.1) of Table 9, and 7.56%
of annual consumption for η = 1 and 12.18% for η = 4 after WTO, see the first “Risk” column
in panel (a.2) of Table 9. Under cu0 these effects go up to 9.99% with η = 1 and 10.76% with
η = 4 before WTO and 15.95% with η = 1 and 20.93% with η = 4 after WTO.
Third, what are the welfare effects of urban growth, risk and insurance on rural households?
We now add the urban insurance technology to our counterfactual, i.e., {γu, σu, ψu}, see the
results in the columns “Insurance Technology” in panel (a.1) and (a.2) in Table 9. Without
level effects, i.e., under cr0, the loss in insurance against transitory shocks for rural households
from embedding them with urban insurance technology implies that the welfare gains from urban
growth and risk go down from 3.28% with a 95% confidence interval of [3.21%, 3.35%] to
.93% with a 95% confidence interval of [.53%, 1.34%] for η = 1 and from 4.00% with a 95%
confidence interval of [3.63%,4.41%] to -3.13% with a 95% confidence interval of [-5.81%,-0.51%]
for η = 4 before WTO. That is, the introduction of a much worse urban insurance technology
(mainly against transitory shocks) on rural households entirely eliminates the welfare gains from
migration in the years before WTO. If we consider that moving from rural to urban areas also
implies an adjustment in the level of consumption of average urban consumption, cu0 , then there
are still welfare gains from migration but these gains drop by more than two-thirds from 10.76%
with a 95% confidence interval of [10.37%,11.20%] to 3.16% with a 95% confidence interval of
[0.31%,5.96%] due to the loss of consumption insurance associated with rural-to-urban migration.
In the years after WTO, urban insurance technology against transitory shocks improves ap-
proaching the degree of insurance in rural areas, mainly due to public transfers (see section 4.2).
This improvement in urban insurance implies that the welfare gains from rural-to-urban migration
after WTO increase with respect to the pre-WTO era. In the post-WTO era we find that the
loss of consumption insurance from rural-to-urban migration implies that the welfare gains from
migration barely drop from 15.95% to 13.33% with η = 1 and from 20.93% to 19.05% with η =
4 under cu0 . Similar qualitative results are attained under c
r
0.
Finally, to explore the effects of public transfers on the incentives to migrate we compute the
welfare gains under our measure of earnings. Focusing on capturing urban level effects under
cu0 , the welfare gains from the extra growth generated by moving a rural household to an urban
area before WTO, i.e., 14.70%, are larger than those attained with disposable income, see panel
(b.1) in Table 9. This is explained by the larger gap of earnings growth between rural and urban
households, 4.58% and 5.91% respectively, as compared to the gap of disposable income growth
of 4.43% and 4.49%. The further introduction of urban risk on rural households increases welfare
gains to 16.68% and the introduction of urban insurance technology decreases these welfare
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gains to 15.86% if η = 4. These changes are not significantly different from each other at a 95%
confidence level. Similar qualitative results are attained after WTO with larger welfare gains, see
panel (b.2) in Table 9.
To summarize, our results imply that the ability to insure consumption is quantitatively impor-
tant for migration decisions and that this ability can be substantially affected by social insurance
policy through public transfers. In the years before 2000, the worse ability to insure consumption
in urban areas compared with rural areas significantly drops the welfare gains of rural-to-urban
migration by 71% under η = 4 and cu0 . However, in the 2000s, improvements in the ability to
insure transitory risk in urban areas (compared with rural areas) due to changes in the compo-
sition of public transfers imply that the welfare gains merely drop by a non-significant 8% after
factoring in the loss in consumption insurance associated with that migration choice.59
7 Policy Experiments: Tensions from Lower Economic Growth
Specifically, we ask: what are the permissible levels of risks and insurance under a specific income
growth rate for the period from 2011 to 2020 that keep the rural and urban residents as happy
as in a world where the status quo persists? The status quo is our reference environment, i.e.,
our estimates of income growth (i.e., γ), risks (i.e., σε and σζ) and degree of consumption
insurance (i.e., ψε and ψζ) of the period 2001 to 2009 in our sample. We consider two additional
counterfactual growth scenarios: γ less .50 percentage points, motivated by the widespread
expectation that in the near term the GDP growth in China will drop,60 and 7.20%, a rate that
approximately delivers the medium-run objective of doubling the 2010 income by 2020.
Our results are in Figure 5. In each panel, all pairs of the variance of income shocks (in
percentage deviations from reference estimates, vertical axis) and the level of insurance (horizontal
axis) preserve the same status-quo welfare. Then, each plotted curve shows the pairs that preserve
this welfare for a specific growth scenario. First, note that these curves are downward sloping,
which shows a negative trade-off between risk stabilization and social insurance policies in terms
of preserving welfare.61 Second, the difference across curves shows the trade-off between growth
59Munshi and Rosenzweig (2016) finds that improvements in risk-sharing by 50% can double the migration
rates in India. If we re-conduct our assessment on the welfare gains of migration simultaneously for our entire
1989-2009 sample as a whole, i.e., without exploring welfare separately for the pre- and post-WTO years, then we
obtain that consumption insurance losses drop the welfare gains of rural-to-urban migration by about one-half, a
similar figure to that in Morten (2013) for temporary migration in village India.
60According to the polling results of 50 economists in leading financial firms regarding the near-term economic
outlook of China by Economic Consensus, the median of the projected GDP growth rate of China in 2015 is
7.00%, which implies a .50% decrease from the growth target set for 2014.
61This is not necessarily the case for developed economies. For example, Krueger and Perri (2006) find that an
increase in income inequality can increase welfare by decreasing the probability of default and hence increasing
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and risk and between growth and insurance. For example, a growth-enhancing reform that shifts
curves to the right implies this economy tolerates more risk or requires less insurance to preserve
welfare. That is, a right shift implies a positive trade-off between growth and risk and a negative
trade-off between growth and insurance. Next, we explore these trade-offs quantitatively.
Let’s focus first on permanent shocks in rural areas (see the top-left panel in Figure 5) and
its reference environment, that is, the point in which the curve associated with reference growth
γ—i.e., the black solid curve—crosses reference insurance (i.e., ψζ = .2968) and reference risk
(i.e., where percentage deviations from σζ are zero). Our results suggest that given γ, the rural
economy would be able to sustain reference welfare with twice as much risk if social insurance
policy improved the transmission of permanent income shocks to consumption to ψζ = .2098,
i.e. by 1/3 its reference value. Instead, if social insurance deteriorates and ψζ increases by 1/3 to
.4, the rural economy would require a risk stabilization policy that reduces the variance of income
risks to 45% of its reference value in order to preserve welfare. Further, if growth reforms do not
succeed and income grows at γ minus .50%—i.e., a shift to the left, the blue dashed curve —then,
for the reference amount of risk, the rural areas would require an improvement in their social
insurance policy that decreases ψζ to .2891, i.e., by .2891/.2968-1=-2.59%. Or, alternatively,
for the reference amount of insurance, the rural areas would require a successful risk stabilization
policy that reduces permanent risk by 5.06%. Instead, if growth-enhancing reforms succeed in
achieving a rural annual growth rate of 7.2%—i.e., a shift to the right, the red dotted curve—
then, keeping the reference permanent risk, rural areas could tolerate a social insurance policy
that increases ψζ to .3255, or keeping the reference amount of insurance, rural areas could tolerate
a more relaxed risk stabilization policy that increases reference risk by 20.32%. We also explore
polices related to transitory risk (see the top-right panel in Figure 5). The level of insurance
against transitory shocks is so high in rural areas that welfare is very inelastic with respect to
risk: While keeping reference growth, transitory risk can double without having to further improve
much the insurance parameter to preserve welfare. A successful growth-enhancing policy of 7.2%
allows for a substantial worsening in insurance that increases ψε by a factor of 7.
Finally, urban areas show a similar scenario in terms permanent risk to that of rural areas
(see the bottom-right panel in Figure 5). Growing at γ minus .50% implies urban areas require,
ceteris paribus, either an improvement in social insurance from .2200 to .2029, i.e. by -7.78%, or
alternatively, an increase in income stabilization to -14.98% of reference permanent risk. Instead,
a boost in growth to 7.2% implies that urban areas can tolerate a more relaxed social insurance
policy that increases ψζ to .2357 (if we were to keep the same amount of permanent risk), or
that amount of credit in equilibrium for the U.S. This suggests that the relationship between risk and insurance
is likely to depend on the aggregate stage of economic development.
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a more relaxed risk stabilization policy that increases permanent risk by 14.82% of its reference
value (if we were to keep the same amount of insurance). Similar to rural areas, we find transitory
risk is more inelastic with respect to welfare, though somewhat less so in urban than in rural areas.
8 Conclusion
The process of economic growth is associated with a deterioration of consumption insurance. We
obtain these results exploiting a rare opportunity to study the transmission of income inequality
to consumption inequality for an economy that for a long period has experienced phenomenal
growth and for which we can build a panel of household-level consumption and income, China
1989-2009. Our analysis show a clear deterioration of consumption insurance against permanent
risks with a loading factor the triples during this period. We relate this insurance loss to two
predominant life-cycle savings for Chinese households, i.e., investments in children and housing.
Our findings have important welfare implications for growth across time and space. First,
rural households would prefer to live in the pre-WTO growth-risk-insurance environment rather
than its post-WTO counterpart, maintaining the same initial condition, despite enjoying more
growth in the post-WTO years. The reason is that in rural areas the welfare losses associated with
the deterioration of insurance against permanent risk in the post-WTO years more than offset
the welfare gains from post-WTO growth. Neither private nor public transfers help mitigate this
insurance loss in rural areas. The case of urban households is different. We find urban households
benefit from public transfers that substantially help them cope with the transmission of transitory
risk to consumption after WTO. Indeed, without these public transfers, urban households would
also choose the pre-WTO growth-risk-insurance environment. Second, although rural households
would (on average) prefer to live in urban areas, the incentives to do so drop by more than two-
thirds in the pre-WTO years after factoring in the worse ability to insure consumption in urban
areas compared with rural areas before the 2000s. However, as we show, the incentives to migrate
can be substantially affected by social insurance policy. In particular, we find improvements in
the ability to insure transitory risk in urban areas in the 2000s, due to changes in the composition
of public transfers, that largely reduce the loss in consumption insurance associated with rural-
to-urban migration.
Ultimately, our results suggest that there is value in assessing welfare across countries taking
into account not only income per capita levels (or growth) but also individual risk and consumption
insurance, and we call for such cross-country welfare evaluations. In doing so, it is natural to
consider cross-country differences in the availability of consumption insurance mechanisms (e.g.
self-insurance, limited commitment, limited information, etc.) and their degree of success within
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countries; see a first argument along these lines in Kocherlakota and Pistaferri (2008). As we
have showed for China, this is particularly relevant for poor countries that start to take off from
stagnation and that, hence, are potentially subject to large income shocks at the household
level. Ours is not the first call for aggregate welfare measures that go beyond growth. Recently,
Jones and Klenow (2016) have suggested welfare measures that include dimensions of economic
inequality within countries. Instead, our exercise focuses on the penalization that the curvature
of the utility function imposes on unanticipated changes in income that cannot be insured, hence
smoothed. In this context, our study is more related to the work in Heathcote et al. (2008, 2014)
in which insurance improvements also increase welfare for the U.S. However, in our framework,
unlike in Heathcote et al. (2008, 2014), output (growth) is exogenously given and we simply
detrend it as in Lucas (1987). This leads to our last statement.
As we look ahead, promising next frameworks are those where growth can be shaped by
risk and insurance and vice versa, an argument that is not necessarily confined to China but
extends to other developing countries. At present, the concepts of growth, risk and insurance
are almost invariably studied in isolation with economic growth being usually explored at the
aggregate/sectoral level (Herrendorf et al., 2014) while risk and insurance are usually explored
at the household/family or village level (Karlan and Morduch, 2010). As per our findings on
the last two decades of successful Chinese economic growth, we believe that shifting the current
paradigm to unified frameworks that jointly determine growth, risk and insurance can be an
important avenue for the positive and normative analysis of poor economies.
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Table 1: Sample Characteristics: A Cross-Sectional Snapshot, CHNS 1989-2009
1989 2009
Total Rural Urban Total Rural Urban
Age 42.0 40.6 44.8 49.0 49.0 49.2
Gender of Head(%)
Male 83.6 88.0 74.8 85.8 88.5 79.5
Female 16.4 12.0 25.2 14.2 11.5 20.5
Education of Head (%)
No schooling 13.5 13.6 13.3 3.4 4.2 1.5
1-9th Grade 63.2 69.9 49.8 65.0 74.3 44.2
Above 9th Grade 23.3 16.5 36.9 31.6 21.5 54.3
Household Structure
Household Size 4.22 4.31 4.04 4.39 4.70 3.70
Weak DR .48 .55 .35 .14 .15 .11
Strong DR .66 .70 .57 .32 .32 .31
Province (%)
Liaoning 12.9 12.7 13.4 11.2 12.1 9.2
Heilongjiang 0 0 0 11.2 10.6 12.5
Jiangsu 11.6 11.9 11.1 11.0 11.3 10.4
Shandong 11.8 11.8 11.8 10.2 10.0 10.6
Henan 12.8 12.7 12.9 11.5 11.3 12.0
Hubei 12.7 12.8 12.6 10.6 10.3 11.4
Hunan 12.7 12.5 13.1 10.7 10.2 11.9
Guangxi 12.9 13.0 12.7 12.1 12.6 11.0
Guizhou 12.6 12.7 12.5 11.4 11.6 11.0
Num. Obs. 3,331 2,227 1,104 3,665 2,542 1,123
Notes: This table shows the summary statistics of the household head’s demographic and education characteristics
as well as the household structure in the level-trimmed CHNS sample of all households who satisfy the sample
selection criteria (see section 3.1).
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Table 2: Income Partition by Rural and Urban Residency, China CHNS 1989 and 2009: Real 2009 USD
Year 1989:
(a) Rural
Bottom(%) Quintiles Top(%) All
0-1 1-5 5-10 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 10-5 5-1 1 0-100
Averages, US$
Consumption 397 375 397 391 400 424 439 491 479 522 516 430
Earnings -13 38 71 80 205 336 497 897 897 1209 1829 413
Disp. Income -5 41 83 95 227 370 568 1039 1015 1410 2042 459
Shares of Total (%)
Consumption .9 3.6 4.5 18.3 18.7 19.6 20.5 22.9 5.6 4.8 1.2 100
Earnings .0 .4 .9 4.0 10.2 16.7 24.7 44.5 10.9 12.1 4.4 100
Disp. Income .0 .4 .9 4.1 9.9 16.1 24.7 45.2 11.0 12.4 4.3 100
Year 2009:
(a) Rural
Bottom(%) Quintiles Top(%) All
0-1 1-5 5-10 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 10-5 5-1 1 0-100
Averages, US$
Consumption 449 421 390 429 529 610 722 882 843 981 1060 637
Earnings 2 20 57 100 368 712 1221 2709 2780 3609 6481 1076
Disp. Income 11 43 99 138 434 794 1360 3122 3038 4414 7788 1169
Shares of Total (%)
Consumption .7 2.6 3.1 13.6 16.8 19.5 22.7 27.4 6.7 5.8 1.7 100
Earnings .0 .1 .3 2.0 7.2 13.9 23.9 53.0 13.6 14.1 6.2 100
Disp. Income .0 .1 .4 2.4 7.4 13.6 23.3 53.4 13.0 15.1 6.5 100
(b) Urban
Bottom(%) Quintiles Top(%) All
0-1 1-5 5-10 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 10-5 5-1 1 0-100
Averages, US$
441 406 363 397 417 471 491 528 528 444 507 458
-4 80 139 147 296 369 473 827 795 1131 1952 430
59 144 231 245 443 575 743 1206 1199 1560 2393 642
Shares of Total (%)
1.0 3.6 3.7 16.9 18.3 20.7 21.4 22.7 5.6 3.8 1.1 100
.0 .8 1.6 7.0 14.1 17.5 22.4 39.0 9.3 10.8 4.3 100
.1 .9 1.8 7.7 13.8 17.9 23.2 37.4 9.3 9.8 3.5 100
(b) Urban
Bottom(%) Quintiles Top(%) All
0-1 1-5 5-10 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 10-5 5-1 1 0-100
Averages, US$
262 398 491 443 683 736 786 871 807 996 880 702
1 24 156 194 621 1117 1776 2936 2822 3167 6341 1388
23 87 256 333 907 1549 2385 4651 4496 6354 11489 1963
Shares of Total (%)
.4 2.3 3.4 12.5 19.5 21.3 22.0 24.7 5.6 5.7 1.2 100
.0 .0 .6 2.9 9.3 16.9 26.7 44.1 10.6 9.7 4.5 100
.0 .2 .7 3.4 9.2 15.8 24.2 47.3 11.4 13.1 5.5 100
Notes: This table shows the statistics of adult-equivalent household consumption, earnings (i.e., income without transfers) and disposable income, ranked
by the adult-equivalent household disposable income, for rural and urban areas of China and for 1989 and 2009. The subtable titled “Averages, US” shows
the average adult-equivalent household consumption, earnings and disposable income (in 2009 US dollars) for the range of the percentiles in the distribution
of adult-equivalent household disposable income indicated by the header of the column. The subtable titled “Shares of Total (%)” shows the percentage of
the relevant consumption or income measure for a range of percentiles in the distribution of adult-equivalent household disposable income out of the simple
aggregate of the consumption or income measure in the sample. For a discussion, see Section 3.2.
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Table 3: Minimum Distance Variance Estimates: Various Income Measures
Disposable Earnings Earnings Earnings Only
Income + Private Transf. + Public Transf.
Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban
σ2ζ 1992-3 .2238 .0774 .2668 .1251 .2091 .0833 .2608 .0780
(.0315) (.0293) (.0327) (.0324) (.0317) (.0296) (.0325) (.0272)
1994-7 .2620 .2456 .2777 .3331 .2103 .2610 .2812 .1616
(.0529) (.0646) (.0535) (.0846) (.0498) (.0708) (.0521) (.0487)
1998-00 .2381 .2055 .2749 .1944 .2032 .1859 .2800 .0723
(.0525) (.0701) (.0553) (.0821) (.0520) (.0857) (.0525) (.0508)
2001-4 .3762 .2501 .4200 .6870 .3881 .3565 .4027 .2063
(.0549) (.0614) (.0585) (.1151) (.0494) (.0807) (.0483) (.0550)
2005-6 .3160 .2432 .3810 .5521 .2718 .1235 .2391 .1316
(.0403) (.0452) (.0399) (.0766) (.0354) (.0393) (.0353) (.0438)
σ2ζ,pre97 (ann.) .0913 .0488 .1050 .0718 .0814 .0521 .1037 .0396
σ2ζ,post97 (ann.) .1170 .0887 .1373 .1888 .1059 .0709 .1067 .0506
σ2ε 1991 .2835 .1267 .2922 .1427 .2870 .1309 .2998 .1520
(.0193) (.0164) (.0201) (.0197) (.0197) (.0166) (.0200) (.0178)
1993 .3874 .2581 .3511 .2103 .3974 .2564 .3544 .1981
(.0320) (.0302) (.0324) (.0332) (.0323) (.0310) (.0326) (.0276)
1997 .4626 .2258 .4774 .3300 .4578 .2171 .4652 .2094
(.0435) (.0503) (.0447) (.0713) (.0425) (.0557) (.0418) (.0475)
2000 .5274 .3062 .5177 .3157 .4758 .3683 .3829 .2788
(.0460) (.0511) (.0465) (.0546) (.0431) (.0580) (.0355) (.0493)
2004 .4660 .3024 .4160 .2652 .3993 .3241 .4037 .2721
(.0352) (.0422) (.0342) (.0541) (.0337) (.0416) (.0329) (.0389)
2006 .3917 .2219 .3658 .2478 .3800 .2576 .3795 .2412
(.0318) (.0369) (.0311) (.0511) (.0287) (.0337) (.0308) (.0426)
σ2ε,pre97 (ann.) .3862 .1999 .3876 .2410 .3875 .1971 .3854 .1878
σ2ε,post97 (ann.) .4504 .2704 .4205 .2710 .4103 .3076 .3884 .2608
Num. Obs 3,560 1,825 3,559 1,820 3,549 1,820 3,546 1,814
Notes: This table shows the estimation results from a partial insurance model where different measures of income
are used, for rural and urban areas separately. The σ2ζ refers to the sum of the variances of permanent shocks
over the period specified in the second column of the table. The σ2ε refers to the variance of transitory shocks
in the year specified in the second column. We also provide the annualized variance of permanent (transitory)
shocks over the pre-1997 period, σ2ζ,pre97 (σ
2
ε,pre97), and that over the post-1997 period, σ
2
ζ,post97 (σ
2
ε,post97).
Asymptotic standard errors are in the parentheses. For a discussion of the model set-up see section 4.1 and of
the results see section 4.2.
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Table 4: Minimum Distance Partial Insurance Estimates: Various Income Measures
Disposable Earnings Earnings Earnings Only
Income + Private Transf. + Public Transf.
Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban
ψζ,pre97 .1207 .0766 .0825 .1219 .1397 .1287 .1082 .2038
(.0437) (.0949) (.0392) (.0765) (.0486) (.0926) (.0385) (.1195)
ψζ,post97 .2968 .2200 .2703 .0704 .3059 .1530 .2796 .1788
(.0320) (.0542) (.0273) (.0320) (.0345) (.0632) (.0358) (.0990)
ψε,pre97 -.0242 .2116 -.0170 .0829 -.0164 .1721 -.0226 .0750
(.0291) (.0526) (.0302) (.0694) (.0288) (.0581) (.0290) (.0727)
ψε,post97 .0062 .0608 -.0160 .1131 .0231 .0832 .0188 .1162
(.0277) (.0588) (.0287) (.0596) (.0300) (.0498) (.0331) (.0542)
σ2ξ .0191 .0162 .0196 .0196 .0189 .0177 .0197 .0192
(.0027) (.0050) (.0027) (.0048) (.0027) (.0048) (.0027) (.0045)
σ2uc 1991 .1219 .1320 .1221 .1329 .1218 .1320 .1215 .1327
(.0050) (.0079) (.0049) (.0082) (.0050) (.0079) (.0049) (.0081)
1993 .1291 .0947 .1294 .1029 .1291 .0976 .1287 .1035
(.0087) (.0136) (.0086) (.0138) (.0086) (.0137) (.0086) (.0136)
1997 .1680 .1569 .1678 .1579 .1691 .1578 .1669 .1597
(.0123) (.0197) (.0123) (.0197) (.0123) (.0197) (.0123) (.0198)
2000 .2091 .1611 .2088 .1537 .2086 .1577 .2076 .1527
(.0133) (.0188) (.0133) (.0187) (.0132) (.0185) (.0133) (.0180)
2004 .1882 .1601 .1881 .1574 .1878 .1593 .1892 .1567
(.0118) (.0180) (.0118) (.0179) (.0118) (.0180) (.0118) (.0178)
2006 .1897 .1839 .1889 .1828 .1913 .1865 .1943 .1824
(.0087) (.0140) (.0087) (.0136) (.0085) (.0138) (.0085) (.0136)
Num. Obs 3,560 1,825 3,559 1,820 3,549 1,820 3,546 1,814
Notes: This table shows the estimation results from a partial insurance model where different measures of income
are used, for rural and urban areas separately. We allow the insurance parameters ψζ (against permanent income
shocks) and ψε (against transitory shocks) to vary from before to after 1997. σ
2
ξ is the variance of the taste shock
and σ2uc is the time-varying variance of the measurement error in consumption. Asymptotic standard errors are
in the parentheses. For a discussion of the model set-up see section 4.1 and of the results see section 4.2.
42
Table 5: Minimum Distance Partial Insurance Estimates: By Investments in Children
Rural Urban
Inv. in Children: Low High Low High
ψζ,pre97 .0991 .1331 .2217 -.0998
(.3085) (.1455) (.2835) (.1241)
ψζ,post97 .1713 .5260 .0639 .5124
(.0686) (.1012) (.0581) (.1383)
Num. Obs. 589 319 242 171
Notes: The partition criterion is based on below (for low) and above (for high) median values of the ratio of
the expenditure on child education to the household saving in 2006. Our measure of income is our benchmark
disposable income. The parameters ψζ,pre97 and ψζ,post97 refer to insurance (loading factors) against permanent
shocks in the pre-1997 period and the post-1997 period. Asymptotic standard errors are in the parentheses. For
a discussion of the results of this Table see section 5. For brevity, only insurance parameters are reported.
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Table 6: Minimum Distance Partial Insurance Estimates: By Housing Wealth
Rural Urban
Housing Wealth: Low High Low High
ψζ,pre97 .1213 .1373 .0850 -.0898
(.0611) (.0671) (.1116) (.2037)
ψζ,post97 .3071 .3313 .0837 .3980
(.0473) (.0501) (.0671) (.0932)
Num. Obs. 1,604 1,580 636 628
Notes: The partition criterion is based on below (for low) and above (for high) median values of housing wealth.
Our measure of income is our benchmark disposable income. The parameters ψζ,pre97 and ψζ,post97 refer to
insurance (loading factors) against permanent shocks in the pre-1997 period and the post-1997 period. Asymptotic
standard errors are in the parentheses. For a discussion of the results of this Table see section 5. For brevity, only
insurance parameters are reported.
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Table 7: Welfare Effects of Growing with Risk, China and U.S.
No Growth No Risk No Growth & No Risk
{0, σζ , σε, ψζ , ψε} {γ, 0, 0, ψζ , ψε} {0, 0, 0, ψζ , ψε}
CRRA Rural Urban U.S. Rural Urban U.S. Rural Urban U.S.
η =1 -37.77% -43.42% -18.22% 1.69% 3.99% 3.30% -36.72% -41.16% -15.52%
η =2 -37.77% -43.42% -18.22% 4.06% 8.94% 6.70% -35.25% -38.36% -12.74%
η =4 -37.77% -43.42% -18.22% 14.58% 27.68% 15.99% -28.70% -27.76% -5.15%
Notes: The reference scenario is defined by the actual estimates of growth, risk and insurance parameters, i.e., {γ, σζ , σε, ψζ , ψε}, separately for rural and
urban China in section 4.2. The values in this table are consumption compensations for variations in growth and/or risk, see section 6 for a discussion. A
positive value indicates a welfare gain of moving to the alternative scenario, that is, the amount of consumption (in units of percentage) across all periods
and states that individuals living in our reference scenario will demand to remain indifferent between their current scenario and the alternative counterfactual
scenario. We consider three alternative combinations of growth and risks scenarios as counterfactuals: Not growing with risks, growing without risk, and the
case of no growth and no risks. For the case of the U.S. we use the benchmark estimates reported in Blundell et al. (2008), i.e., the before-tax earnings as
is in the case of earnings only in their Table 7; only male earnings net of own taxes is available. For the U.S. we use an average growth rate of real personal
income of 2.87%, and of real personal disposable income of 2.96% for the period 1979-1992—these figures are computed using the nominal values from
personal income and personal disposable income from NIPA-Table 2.1 deflated with the price index for personal consumption expenditures from NIPA-Table
2.3.4. For the case of China, we conduct this exercise separately for rural and urban households. All our results are significantly different from zero at 95%
confidence levels.
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Table 8: Welfare Effects of Growth, Risk and Insurance Across Time: Pre-WTO to Post-WTO
(a) Disposable Income
(a.1) Rural
Cumulative Effect: Pre-WTO (pre) to Post-WTO (post)
Growth Risk Insurance Tech.
CRRA: {γpost, σpre, ψpre} {γpost, σpost, ψpre} {γpost, σpost, ψpost}
cpre0 c
post
0 c
pre
0 c
post
0 c
pre
0 c
post
0
η =1 4.37% 40.90% 4.20% 40.68% 1.25% 36.68%
η =2 4.37% 40.90% 3.95% 40.34% -2.12% 32.14%
η =4 4.37% 40.90% 3.16% 39.27% -9.05% 22.79%
(a.2) Urban
Cumulative Effect: Pre-WTO (pre) to Post-WTO (post)
Growth Risk Insurance Tech.
CRRA: {γpost, σpre, ψpre} {γpost, σpost, ψpre} {γpost, σpost, ψpost}
cpre0 c
post
0 c
pre
0 c
post
0 c
pre
0 c
post
0
η =1 10.31% 50.02% -19.65% 9.28% 11.42% 51.53%
η =2 10.31% 50.02% -15.34% 15.13% 12.62% 53.16%
η =4 10.31% 50.02% -6.57% 27.06% 21.33% 65.01%
(b) Earnings
(b.1) Rural
Cumulative Effect: Pre-WTO (pre) to Post-WTO (post)
Growth Risk Insurance Tech.
CRRA: {γpost, σpre, ψpre} {γpost, σpost, ψpre} {γpost, σpost, ψpost}
cpre0 c
post
0 c
pre
0 c
post
0 c
pre
0 c
post
0
η =1 4.03% 40.43% 4.06% 40.48% 1.71% 37.31%
η =2 4.03% 40.43% 4.04% 40.46% -0.74% 34.00%
η =4 4.03% 40.43% 3.88% 40.23% -5.20% 27.99%
(b.2) Urban
Cumulative Effect: Pre-WTO (pre) to Post-WTO (post)
Growth Risk Insurance Tech.
CRRA: {γpost, σpre, ψpre} {γpost, σpost, ψpre} {γpost, σpost, ψpost}
cpre0 c
post
0 c
pre
0 c
post
0 c
pre
0 c
post
0
η =1 1.53% 38.08% -24.57% 2.59% 0.58% 36.78%
η =2 1.53% 38.08% -19.70% 9.20% -0.57% 35.23%
η =4 1.53% 38.08% -12.15% 19.48% -4.28% 30.18%
Notes: We take as reference scenario the actual estimates of growth, risk and insurance in the pre-WTO period reported in section 4.2. We do this
separately for two measures of household income, disposable income in panel (a) and earnings in panel (b). The columns headed with cpre0 refer to the case
where we keep the initial level of consumption in 1989 in the counterfactual environment, while the columns headed with cpost0 refer to the case where we
replace the initial level of consumption in 1989 for the initial level of consumption in 2000 in the counterfactual environment.
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Table 9: Welfare Effects of Growth, Risk and Insurance Across Space: Rural to Urban
(a) Disposable Income
(a.1) Pre-WTO
Cumulative Effect: Rural (r) to Urban (u)
Growth Risk Insurance Tech.
CRRA: {γu, σr, ψr} {γu, σu, ψr} {γu, σu, ψu}
cr0 c
u
0 c
r
0 c
u
0 c
r
0 c
u
0
η =1 2.98% 9.68% 3.28% 9.99% 0.96% 7.53%
η =2 2.98% 9.68% 3.55% 10.28% -0.62% 5.83%
η =4 2.98% 9.68% 4.00% 10.76% -3.13% 3.16%
(a.2) Post-WTO
Cumulative Effect: Rural (r) to Urban (u)
Growth Risk Insurance Tech.
CRRA: {γu, σr, ψr} {γu, σu, ψr} {γu, σu, ψu}
cr0 c
u
0 c
r
0 c
u
0 c
r
0 c
u
0
η =1 6.24% 14.53% 7.56% 15.95% 5.13% 13.33%
η =2 6.24% 14.53% 8.87% 17.36% 5.29% 13.50%
η =4 6.24% 14.53% 12.18% 20.93% 10.44% 19.05%
(b) Earnings
(b.1) Pre-WTO
Cumulative Effect: Rural (r) to Urban (u)
Growth Risk Insurance Tech.
CRRA: {γu, σr, ψr} {γu, σu, ψr} {γu, σu, ψu}
cr0 c
u
0 c
r
0 c
u
0 c
r
0 c
u
0
η =1 7.70% 14.70% 8.09% 15.11% 7.29% 14.27%
η =2 7.70% 14.70% 8.52% 15.57% 7.11% 14.08%
η =4 7.70% 14.70% 9.56% 16.68% 8.79% 15.86%
(b.2) Post-WTO
Cumulative Effect: Rural (r) to Urban (u)
Growth Risk Insurance Tech.
CRRA: {γu, σr, ψr} {γu, σu, ψr} {γu, σu, ψu}
cr0 c
u
0 c
r
0 c
u
0 c
r
0 c
u
0
η =1 3.63% 11.71% 5.70% 13.94% 4.06% 12.18%
η =2 3.63% 11.71% 8.05% 16.48% 5.04% 13.23%
η =4 3.63% 11.71% 13.18% 22.01% 10.94% 19.59%
Notes: We take as reference scenario the actual estimates of growth, risk and insurance in the rural areas reported in section 4.2 for two measures of
household income, disposable income in panel (a) and earnings in panel (b). We do this separately for the pre- and post-WTO sample periods. The columns
headed with cr0 refer to the case where we keep the initial level of rural consumption in the counterfactual environment, while the columns headed with c
u
0
refer to the case where we replace the initial level of rural consumption for the initial level of urban consumption in the counterfactual environment.
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Figure 1: Public and Private Transfers (% of Income), CHNS, China 1989-2009
Notes: We plot the share of the aggregate amount of various public and private transfers in the aggregate income from 1989 to 2009 for the rural and urban
CHNS sample separately. For the construction of the measure of transfers see section 3.1 in the text and section A.3 in the Appendix. For a discussion of
the transfers system in China, see section 2. For a discussion of the role transfers plays in consumption insurance in China see section 4.2.
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Figure 2: Household Per Capita Net Income and Food Expenditure, CHNS and CSYB, China 1989-2009
Notes: The top figures show the household per capita net income from the CHNS against the household per capita net income from the CSYBs, for rural
and urban China. The net income in the CHNS is constructed by deducting from the disposable income the value of in-kind transfers. The rural and urban
household per capita net income from the CSYBs are derived from the provincial counterparts weighted according to the population weights in the CHNS.
Real GDP per capita from the Penn World Table is also included in the two figures.The bottom two panels show the household per capita food expenditure
from the CHNS and from the CSYBs. The food expenditure in the CHNS is constructed by deducting from the value of diet the value of food coupons and
food gifts. All values are normalized to 1 in 1989. For a discussion on the data construction, see section 3.1.
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Figure 3: Adult-Equivalent Consumption and Income Inequality, Variance of Logs, CHNS, China 1989-2009
Notes: The left column shows the evolution of the variance of logged household consumption and disposable income from 1989 to 2009. The middle column
shows the evolution of the variance of the NAS adult-equivalence scale and the number of adults, the covariance of the former with household consumption
and the covariance of the latter with household disposable income. The right column shows the evolution of the variances of adult-equivalent consumption
and disposable income normalized to 0 in 1989. For a discussion on the facts, see section 3.2.
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Figure 4: Residual Consumption and Income Inequality, Variance of Logs, CHNS, China 1989-2009
Notes: The left column shows the evolution of the raw and residual inequality of the adult-equivalent consumption and disposable income from 1989 to
2009. The middle column shows the evolution of the residual inequality of consumption and disposable income, normalized to 0 in 1989, from 1989 to 2009.
The right column shows the evolution of the covariance of residual adult-equivalent consumption and disposable income from 1989 to 2009. For a discussion
on the facts, see section 3.2.
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Figure 5: Welfare Preserving Policy Experiments: Growth Reforms vs. Stabilization Policies vs. Social Insurance Policies
Notes: In each panel all combinations of the variance of income shocks (in percentage deviations from reference estimates, vertical axis) and the level
of insurance (horizontal axis) preserve status-quo/reference welfare and each curve consists of the combinations that preserve status-quo/reference welfare
under a specific growth scenario. We entertain three income growth scenarios: the reference income growth rate minus 50 basis points, the reference and an
optimistic 7.2%. For a discussion of the policy experiment, see section 7. The average rural income growth that defines our reference environment is 5.20%
and the urban income growth rate is 6.71%, i.e., the post-WTO average income growth rates. The estimated reference annualized variance of permanent
shocks, averaged over 2001 to 2009, is .1305 in rural areas and .0946 in urban areas. The numbers for the annualized variance of transitory shocks are
.4295 in rural areas and .2580 in urban areas. Finally, the estimated reference insurance parameters in rural and urban areas are taken to be the same as the
(ψpostζ , ψ
post
ε ) in our benchmark.
52
